University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Doctoral Dissertations

University of Connecticut Graduate School

8-23-2013

Probabilistic and Dynamical Models of Belief
Update: Effects of Experimentally Induced Implicit
Bias
Stephanie Petrusz
University of Connecticut - Storrs, stephanie.petrusz@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations
Recommended Citation
Petrusz, Stephanie, "Probabilistic and Dynamical Models of Belief Update: Effects of Experimentally Induced Implicit Bias" (2013).
Doctoral Dissertations. 229.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/229

Probabilistic and Dynamical Models of Belief:
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Organisms undertake actions on the basis of perceptions. Perceptions serve as the basis
for what an agent takes to be the case; that is, for the agent’s beliefs. However, the idea of
belief is freighted with notions of fallibility and subjectivity, since belief is often
considered insofar as it is distinct from knowledge. Here, an attempt is made to link belief
more closely with perception and action. This linkage is shown by considering the role
belief plays in determining behavior, which is distinct from the role belief plays in
language-based philosophical accounts of content and intention. These two notions of
belief, and the separation between them, are the subjects of four experiments in which a
method of introducing bias in participant responses is employed. In a perceptual task
based on the Asch line-length judgment paradigm, participants showed a propensity to
respond in keeping with the induced bias rather than with stimulus properties. In a
cognitive task based on the Monty Hall Dilemma, participants’ responses were consistent
with the induced bias but were less consistent with the best MHD strategy. Experiment 1
established the line-length methodology, which was extended in Experiment 2.
Experiment 3 employed the MHD paradigm. Experiment 4 brought the current linelength paradigm into closer contact with the classic Asch paradigm. The overall results
were consistent with the claim that belief-as-action and belief-as-assent can, theoretically
and methodologically, be treated separately.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The conditions under which an agent may be said to believe can be cashed out in
different ways. Belief is essentially an agent’s holding that a proposition or state of
affairs is the case, and as such is to a large extent inaccessible to external assessment. For
this reason some psychologists and philosophers have ignored terms like belief as
meaningless when incorporated into theories. However Fodor (1975) argues that the
etiology and explanation of behavior ultimately rests on propositional attitudes, and can
never be cashed out in strictly behavioral terms—some reference to mental states or
processes is always necessary. In either case such attitudes held by an agent cannot be
directly measured.
There are two related but distinct ways to behaviorally assess belief: an agent may
assent to the truth or falsity of a proposition, or an agent may be disposed to act as though
a proposition is true—or, if one wishes to avoid speaking as though propositions are the
contents of beliefs, to act as though a state of affairs obtains. From an eliminativist or
reductionist perspective these externally-accessible measures are all there is to belief;
however, from a competing perspective these measures are, in some sense, related to, or
determined by, something more.
How can belief, over and above the behaviors it might support, be investigated? A
large literature in contemporary formal epistemology centers on questions of how beliefs
change, rather than the less tractable questions concerning the content or justification of
belief. Existing accounts of belief change share certain features: they concern
propositions, they are framed in terms of state-to-state changes, and they generally
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ascribe probabilities as weights to beliefs. Various mathematical models of belief-change
(as it might be undertaken by human, artificial, or unspecified agents) have been
proposed. Among the arguments leveraged by epistemologists is that a basic species of
Bayesian revision is probably inadequate to model belief change. Evaluating the
conditionals required by Bayesian update is problematic for reasons including the
complexity of agents’ existing commitments (see, for instance, the “web of belief” of
Quine and Ullian, 1978) and the difficulty of evaluating the probability of some fact
against an unenumerated backdrop of possibilities. Haselager, van Dijk and van Rooij
(2008) argue that understanding belief essentially requires understanding the problem of
abduction, and doubt whether a traditional brain-based cognitive theory is adequate.
Rellihan’s (2009) effort to salvage abduction in the face of Fodor’s (2000) dismissal
makes explicit reference to the Quinean belief structure in which agents are enmeshed.
Such criticisms and suggested revisions cast serious doubt on the viability of a
computational theory of abduction. In Fodor’s (2000, p. 41) words: “Abduction really is a
terrible problem for cognitive science, one that is unlikely to be solved by any kind of
theory we have heard so far.”
Models of belief update proposed by epistemologists involve a variety of
mathematical refinements that are largely foreign to discussions of Bayesian models in
psychology. Nonetheless, philosophers friendly to the probabilistic perspective may still
entertain doubts as to the adequacy of any computational treatment of abduction (see van
Fraassen (1989), cited in Arlo-Costa, unpublished). Though the sophistication of some
epistemological accounts should recommend them over models based on toy problems,
such models have the luxury of leaving unengaged the question of what the beliefs that
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feature in them actually are. But an empirical investigation of belief depends on having
some answer to that question.
The Elio and Pelletier (1997) paradigm
For a fictional state of affairs X, participants were presented with an initial set of facts
and were then given a new fact about X that was incompatible with their initial set of
commitments. They were then asked to choose one or more of their initial commitments
to disbelieve or regard as uncertain in order to incorporate the new fact. Though the
results were informative with respect to belief update, the experiments only involved
propositional beliefs – either as statements incorporated into a narrative, or as symbols
representative of propositions, as is common in first-order logic. Participants were also
asked to treat the information given them as true, and thus were engaged in a kind of
suppositional reasoning rather than a direct assessment or manipulation of beliefs actually
held. It is probably for logistical reasons that these more direct methods have not been
employed in investigating beliefs.
The species of belief dealt with by Elio and Pelletier is closest to the notion of belief
as disposition to assent to a proposition. It may be that a disposition to act as though a
state of affairs obtains gets at a more deeply rooted notion of belief. However, it may also
be that when the cost of an action is low, there is little reason not to go along with what
seems to be the case, even if an agent privately maintains reservations. In order to
investigate belief empirically it is necessary to attempt to disentangle these notions of
belief, since they do not necessarily go together and may lead an agent in different
directions. A more fully developed attempt to research belief would have to make sense
of these distinct notions, and should permit some conclusions to be drawn regarding
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changes in belief, as these may be revelatory of the structure or underpinning of belief.
An experimentally based account of belief change may be compared to existing models
of belief that are anchored by mathematics rather than behavioral data.
The Baratgin and Politzer (2010) paradigm
Participants in a series of experiments were presented with versions of the Monty
Hall scenario, a problem of probability so named because of its similarity to the game
show Let’s Make a Deal, hosted by Monty Hall. In the scenario, a player on a fictional
game show is offered a choice of three prizes, each one hidden behind a door. One of the
doors conceals a car. Behind the other two doors are goats. After the player chooses a
door, the host tells the player he will open one of the two remaining doors, invariably
revealing a goat. He then allows the player to keep their original door or switch their pick
to the third door. The problem consists in the fact that although, mathematically, players
always maximize their chance of winning the car by switching, real human agents not
only seldom switch, but even upon having the solution explained in detail often resist
accepting that switching is the rational decision.
Baratgin and Politzer hypothesize that the widespread difficulty people have in
adopting a winning strategy is based on a tendency to incorporate previously unknown
facts that are irrelevant to the outcome probabilities as though they were in fact useful. In
their experiments the location of a “goat” is presented sometimes in a context that
encourages participants to update based on the new fact (as in the Monty Hall scenario)
and other times in a way that makes it clear nothing about the problem has changed as a
result of the new fact. When presented with the latter case participants do not make the
same systematic errors, though their ability to correctly assess the probability of the “car”
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being in a certain location collapses quickly with the introduction of more “doors”. The
problem of irrelevant facts is not unique to problems of rational agency. Indeed, it may be
a challenge for organisms generally. Latty and Beekman (2011) demonstrated that the
slime mold (Physarum polycephalum) alters its preferences for food sources when its set
of alternatives is expanded to include potential sources so unattractive as to be rationally
irrelevant to the choice of source. It may be that the presence of an additional fact is
sufficient for an organism to entertain its relevance.
The Asch (1955) paradigm
Although often framed in terms of social conformity, the classic Asch line length
judgment studies, in our view, constitute a case of conflict between the two sorts of belief
introduced above. One of his famous experiments proceeded in this way: a group of
participants is shown an image of a line, and then shown a set of three lines. Their task is
to choose the line among the three that matches the length of the first line they were
shown. Each participant responds individually and publicly, by saying aloud which line
they’ve chosen. The trick of the experiment is that only one of the participants is truly
participating in the experiment – the others are confederates. When asked, each
confederate will choose a line that does not match the originally displayed line. The
participant, then, has a choice: to allow his actions to be guided by the evidence of his
senses, and publicly disagree with his “co-participants”, or to follow the wisdom of the
crowd and give an answer he likely believes to be wrong.
Asch found that about a third of the time a participant would choose to respond in
keeping with the confederates rather than give the obviously correct judgment. He also
found that the likelihood of a participant making the conforming response increased with
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the number of confederates, up to 7 confederates. These results are typically interpreted
as providing evidence of people’s willingness to conform when under social pressure to
do so.
Frank (2008) reanalyzed the Asch data using a winner-take-all model. This analysis
showed that Asch’s results are not particular either to the task or to the social nature of
the pressure brought to bear on the participant – rather, the pattern of participant
responses indicates the structure of the underlying dynamics of systems with a limited
number of possible states (in this case, a participant’s conforming or not conforming) and
pressure to be in one of the possible states.
For present purposes, we take this analysis and combine it with the two species of
belief mentioned above. This combination of factors forms the basis of an experimental
method for investigating belief in its dual nature as a highly multidimensional,
interconnected network, and as the relatively low-dimensional set of possible action
responses the dynamics of the network may yield. As described below, in the present set
of experiments we take the Asch line length judgment task and extend it further into the
realm of dynamical analyses.
Steps towards operationalizing belief
The experiments discussed above leave several issues unaddressed. The Elio and
Pelletier case does not address the problem of implicit beliefs and biases. It also raises a
particularly thorny issue—the contrast between the description of beliefs and the content
of beliefs. This issue will be taken up in the discussion. For the moment it is sufficient to
note that, while having the belief that Blorgons are evil is likely to yield both assent to the
proposition that “‘Blorgons are evil’ is true” and, in the presence of Blorgons, acting in
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accordance with their assumed evil, avoiding Blorgons and ascribing ill intent to them is
not necessarily equivalent to having in mind the proposition that Blorgons are evil.
Reflecting on the classical Asch (1951) conformity study raises another central issue: the
conflation of belief as assent and belief as the basis for action. As previously argued, the
two notions of belief are related but not equivalent. The Asch study seems, intuitively, to
be a case where participants were prepared to act as though they believed a proposition
they might not have actually believed. Privately held propositional beliefs are difficult to
assess, for reasons including experimental demand characteristics and the fact that any
response made as the result of probing one’s propositional beliefs is, necessarily, an
action in itself. There are psychological methods (name some) for implicitly assessing
biases without the participant being aware either of the bias or of the assessment, and
some such method is needed to investigate belief.
Addressing these concerns was a guiding principle of the design of the present
experiments. A first desideratum was to avoid using propositionally construed beliefs in
favor of something more fundamental. Fodor (1975) argued that perception is, in essence,
a species of belief—one that, though it may have a propositional description, is not
necessarily propositional in character. The experimental task, therefore, was one wherein
participants could make perception-based judgments, one that promises to provide insight
into the beliefs that ground those judgments. A second desideratum was to offer
participants the opportunity (lacking in the Asch study) to vacillate while still making a
desired response—in effect to say, “I’m responding this way but I don’t know if I
should”. Satisfying this desideratum requires keeping the response and the level of
confidence in the response as closely tied as possible. In a task that satisfies this latter
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requirement, participants use the spatial layout of a computer screen to respond in two
dimensions with a single action: clicking on the left or right side of the screen provides
the overt action measure of belief, while the click location’s particular distance away
from the center of the screen provides a measure of confidence or willingness to assent to
the same belief.
In a setting satisfying all the above desiderata, the paradigm of judging line-length is
especially attractive because of the existence of the Asch body of literature, including the
analysis of Frank (2008), wherein the Asch data is already treated as a dynamical system.
Since the same analysis was intended in the present research, a task of similar form is to
be preferred.
The challenge of judgments in experiments on perception
Finding reliable and accurate experimental measures of the judgments made in
perception experiments is fraught with difficulty. Judgments in a perception-action task
often change relative to the measures that are imposed. Yet this fact can itself reveal
something of the underlying structure of the perceiving-acting system that confronts a
particular task on a particular occasion. Lee, Lee, Carello and Turvey (2012)
demonstrated that skilled archers’ judgments of the size of an archery target depended
both on the difficulty of the shot and the success of the archer. Easier shots and more
successful shots were judged as being directed towards larger targets. This finding
extends an existing line of research that shows the effects of effort on judgments of
properties like size and distance (Proffitt, 2008; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013). It also
indicates, however, that judgments in a perception-action task are a function of more than
the properties of distal objects.
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The foregoing lesson is also valuable for experimental considerations of belief. It is
commonly accepted that beliefs are not held in a vacuum; however, of the arbitrarily
many beliefs that an agent may hold, obtaining any measure of the ones that are local or
relevant to a belief that is being perturbed by new facts or by a particular task is a
problem that has yet to be resolved. One possible constraint on neighborhoods of belief is
the sort of occasion variable that is part of the formal definition of Gibson’s (1979/1986)
concept of affordance (Petrusz & Turvey, 2010; Shaw, Turvey & Mace, 1982). Certainly
some sort of constraint on neighborhoods of relevant beliefs is desirable. Rellihan’s
(2007) analysis of the problem of abduction as presented by Fodor (2000) illustrates why.
A computational model of abduction would have three desirable features: it should be
modular, it should be reliable, and it should be implementable in polynomial time (i.e., it
should be computationally feasible). Any two of these might be gotten together, but at the
cost of the third—inferences could be modular and reliable, but then they might take
arbitrarily long to determine. Or they could be reliable and relatively quick, but then they
could not be modular—they would need to range over the entirety of an agent’s beliefs.
Then again, it could be modular and quick, but then there could be no guarantee of
reliability.
The present experiments: Basic design and significance
In the research to be reported the experimental design used to study belief was, as
presaged above, a conceptual extension of the now-classic Asch (1955) paradigm. In
Asch’s experiment participants were swayed by social factors into giving responses on
line lengths that were patently not in keeping with the available optical information.
Presumably, the participants did not really believe that a physically and noticeably
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shorter line was in fact longer, but were pressured to act as though they believed it was.
In the present series of experiments, participants must choose a line (or its functional
equivalent), thus acting as though they believe that it is the longer line (or the right
functional equivalent), but they are also allowed to inform the experimenter about
whether they “really” believe in their choice.
To date “beliefs” have functioned as part of computational and representational
theories of cognition. Here, beliefs are investigated experimentally as judgment aspects
of perception-action tasks. Attempts are made to manipulate beliefs with the goal of
understanding belief as an underwriter of action as distinct from ascribing truth to a
proposition. Divorcing belief from its propositional and representational character is a
first step toward naturalizing belief as a guide for action. Further, the analytical
techniques brought to bear on the resulting data constitute an attempt to directly contrast
models that are irreducibly probabilistic and computational against those that treat belief
as part of the ongoing tasks of a perceiving-acting system.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODS IN OVERVIEW
The four experiments presented here are targeted at addressing two categories of
questions. First, when there are multiple strategies for dealing with probabilistic stimuli,
which will be chosen, and on the basis of what information? Second, when engaged in a
task without explicit requirements, is there a separation between participants’ beliefs as
the basis for action and propositional beliefs about the task? Addressing these questions
created several requirements for the design of the present experiments. Briefly, the
stimuli should be probabilistic in character, since the ability of participants to pick up on
environmental probability distributions is at issue. The stimulus probabilities should be
available to the experimenter but not obviously available to the participant, so that
participants can respond to the stimulus distributions on the basis of perceiving rather
than cogitating. The experiments must yield a sufficient number of data points to tease
apart different strategies that might be used by the participants, and to examine the
dynamics of participant strategies over time. Finally, the experiments should provide an
opportunity to measure both species of belief while placing the fewest demands on the
participant. The experiments, described in detail below, were designed with all these
goals in mind.
A Matlab program generated the line-length stimuli presented to participants in
Experiments 1 and 2. The experimenter runs the program by means of a script containing
five independent parameters that the experimenter may set before each block: the
standard length of a line in pixels, the maximum difference (in pixels) between the lines
in a pair, the number of pairs to be presented in a block, the proportion of lines that differ
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by less than the JND, and the proportion of pairs in which the left line is longer. This
design allows for great flexibility in the presentation of the stimuli with little effort on the
part of the experimenter while the experiment is actually being run. The standard length
and maximum difference were the same for all participants and all blocks. The number of
trials differed only by Phase. For example, in Experiment 2 (an elaboration of
Experiment 1) all participants made judgments on 100 pairs in Block 1 defining Phase 0,
100 pairs in Blocks 2-5 defining Phase 1, and on 50 pairs in Blocks 6-8 defining Phase 2.
However, the two probabilistic parameters (proportion of below-JND pairs and
proportion of left-line-longer pairs) have consequences for the analysis of participant
data, as described below.
The design of the experiment calls for a certain proportion of line pairs (80% or 20%
depending on group) to be left-line-longer pairs. Instead of generating the line pairs in
advance and presenting them randomly, on each trial the program generates a pair of
lines. In each case, the left line of the pair is longer. Then, based on an experimenterspecified “flip percentage” parameter, the pair is displayed on the screen as either rightline or left-line-longer. The flip parameter makes use of Matlab’s randomization function
as follows: a number is randomly generated and if it is less than the specified “flip
percentage” the pair is displayed with the longer line on the right side of the screen. The
proportion of below-JND pairs is established in the same way: the experimenter specifies
a proportion of pairs to be below-JND (in this case, .5 for all participants and all blocks),
and for each line pair generated a random number is also generated. If that number is
below .5, the difference (in pixels) between lines is (again, randomly) chosen from an
interval ranging from 0 to the value of the JND. If the number is above .5, the difference
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(in pixels) between lines is randomly chosen from an interval ranging from the value of
the JND up to the maximum difference between lines.
This program design means that the actual proportions of left-line-longer pairs and
below-JND pairs differ slightly from participant to participant and from block to block.
For this reason data from each participant are coded as being in either the left-bias or
right-bias group, and also as having a certain post hoc presentation proportion. In
Experiment 2, the first 100-trial block, alias Phase 0, was unbiased—the probability that
a pair would be left-line-longer was .5. Blocks 2 through 5 of Phase 1were biased as
described above, and the final three 50-trial blocks comprising Phase 2 were again
unbiased. The basic hypothesis was that in the initial unbiased block participants would
click on the right or left line based on a combination of stimulus properties (which line
was longer) and guessing (when it was not apparent which line was longer). The
introduction of the stimulus bias in Blocks 2 through 5 was predicted to bias responses
accordingly, for above-JND stimuli. A central question of the experiments was whether
that bias would carry over into the below-JND stimuli. In order to strengthen the bias, the
experiments also incorporated an additional bias in the form of a score. Participants were
given instructions to choose the longer of each pair of lines, and were told that the score
would increase as they performed better on the task, and would decrease if they
performed worse. However, the score actually was designed to introduce a bias towards
responding that the right line was longer (right-bias condition) or the left line was longer
(left-bias condition). This manipulation, heretofore designated as “score”, is a key
element of the experimental procedure. To clarify, using Experiment 2 as the example,
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“score” was in effect in Blocks 2-5 (Phase 1) but not in effect in Block 1 (Phase 0) and
not in effect in Blocks 6-8 (Phase 2).
Experiment 3 used stimuli presented to participants using a webpage designed with
Adobe Flash. It consisted of a modified Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD), using a standard 3door case. Behind each door was a square colored a different shade of red. The red values
were randomly generated from a range of RGB values. The “prize” was the brightest of
the three shades of red generated on each trial. Although a line-length version of MHD
was considered, pilot work indicated that the non-discriminable range around the JND,
which was an advantage in Experiments 1 and 2, made it too difficult for participants to
find the “prize” lines and discover MHD strategies. Color was therefore chosen as a
stimulus property that is both salient to participants and easy to program.
Experiment 4 returned to the method used in Experiments 1 and 2, but more closely
approached the original Asch design with the introduction of two new manipulations.
First, while the stimuli remained the same as in Experiments 1 and 2, the generation of
“score” was altered in the Matlab program to increment when participants responded on
the side of the screen with fewer longer lines, and to decrement when participants
responded in keeping with the stimulus pair properties. Second, in Experiment 4
participants were told that the “score” variable was a measure of the degree to which their
responses matched the responses of a previous participant. This fiction, together with the
reversal of the direction of “score”, was intended to generate conflict between stimulus
properties (which line is longer) and social pressure (supposed agreement with another
participant).
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CHAPTER 3
CONSIDERATIONS OF “BELIEF”
The epistemological literature approaches belief from a different standpoint than the
psychological literature. Instead of treating belief as a psychological capacity whose
explanation is contingent on other psychological capacities, an epistemological inquiry
into belief depends on an inquiry into what facts about the world make belief logically
and actually possible. Though epistemology as a discipline has traditionally been
concerned with problems of knowledge, the definition of knowledge as “justified true
belief” has brought focus onto the issue of belief. The central distinction to be drawn
between knowledge and belief is that while a belief may be false, knowledge may not.
Importantly, though, an agent cannot be said to know something that it does not also
believe. The two notions are therefore closely tied. Another important insight following
from the close connection between knowledge and belief is that in order for an agent to
learn the agent’s beliefs must be able to change. What follows is an attempt to outline the
recent history of epistemological approaches to belief, especially efforts to formalize
belief and belief update, and what insights such approaches may have for studying belief
change from a psychological standpoint. It is important to remember, for the purposes of
this discussion, that theory-laden terms such as “learn”, “know”, and “believe” may have
different meanings in philosophical and psychological theories, and in some cases may be
used more or less colloquially rather than rigorously.
Belief as propositional and probabilistic
Belief is commonly construed as a propositional attitude, and beliefs are described as
having the form “X believes that P”. That beliefs are taken to feature propositions has led
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to beliefs being treated as basically language-like, and sharing characteristics in common
with other features of language, such as syntax, truth-value, and reference. Because a
belief is a propositional attitude there is a distinction between the truth of the attitude (X
does, in fact, believe that P) and the truth of the proposition that P expresses. The
meaning of this disconnect is that, while beliefs are about the world or parts of it, beliefs
can also be wrong. That is, X can believe that, for instance, snow is white, and the
proposition “snow is white” may be true, but X could also believe that snow is green.
From this beginning we may address a psychological question: How are belief and action
related? We will examine three possible answers.
Armstrong (1973, 2010) argues that perception is essentially a matter of belief. This
argument turns on a congruity between features of a propositional account of belief and a
representational theory of perception. Representational accounts of perception rely on the
assumptions that perceptions can be erroneous, and that the error results from an
impoverished mapping between the world and its representation. Perception is the carrier
of facts about the world, but it doesn’t do a perfect job. A propositional account of belief
will show that belief shares these characteristics—beliefs are about the world, but our
evidence about the world is not perfect, and we do not treat all evidence perfectly
rationally. So beliefs can be wrong.
Armstrong’s argument that perceptions are beliefs is based on what he terms the
“argument from illusion”. He uses perceptual illusions as evidence for the flawed nature
of perception and argues that what underlies our reliance on perception is the fact that we
believe our perceptions, even in cases where they do not correspond with the world.
Another influential assessment of the degree to which beliefs are (or are like)
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propositions is due to Ramsey (1926/1990). In his “General Propositions and Causality”
he makes an elegant argument that in many respects beliefs are not really like
propositions. He regards beliefs as the sort of things that guide behavior, and says that
general propositions – those that are facts about classes of things rather than particulars –
are not, because of their very generality, specific enough to serve as guides to action.
Further, he claims that, although beliefs may still be sentence-like, they do not behave as
truth-carriers in the sense that propositions do; that is, they are not evaluated as true or
false, but rather as carrying a certain weight, or may remain unevaluated or even
unentertained. He terms sentences of this type “variable hypotheticals” and gives them a
status which is particularly revelatory for the present purposes: “Variable
hypotheticals…form the system with which the speaker meets the future...[They] are not
judgments but rules for judging.” (Ramsey, 1990, p. 241)
Ramsey’s discussion raises several key points. First, beliefs are not necessarily to be
understood as propositions. In an important sense their more essential character is as
guides for action, and actions are not necessarily undertaken on the basis of agreement or
disagreement with a proposition, but on the basis of judgments about what seems likely
to the believer to be appropriate on some occasion. Second, these judgments are assessed
not in terms of truth or falsity but against a backdrop of likelihood – that is, some kind of
probability. Third, these probabilities are subjective – they are determined for individual
believers, not (or not exclusively) by external states of affairs.
Ramsey’s arguments show the way in which belief can be subjective and valued by
degrees. This is important to bear in mind when examining arguments of the kind offered
by Armstrong, in order to maintain the distinctions between a theory of actions
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underwritten by the sort of things that can be wrong and a theory of actions underwritten
by the sort of things that can be relatively likely or relatively clear.
If beliefs are construed as propositions in the way outlined above, then regarding
beliefs as the foundation of perception is something to be avoided by those who take
perception to be direct (Shaw, Turvey & Mace, 1982). A theory of direct perception
would not allow Armstrong’s argument from illusion: perception is incorrigible, and
therefore illusion is by definition not perception. Shaw et al. say that perception is more
like knowledge than like belief, but a traditional account of knowledge would say that
knowing something also entails believing it. On this reading, perceptions are the sort of
things that a perceiver believes, but they are not themselves conditioned on beliefs.
But perceptions are like beliefs in a further sense, which is made clear by Ramsey:
perceptions are the sorts of things that guide action, and it is in the sense of belief as a
guide for action that belief and perception are closest. Both perceptions and beliefs form
the basis for action. Both perception and belief may be more or less thoroughly
constrained by the facts of the world. And what is perceived or believed depends strongly
on the character of the perceiver/believer, on each one’s particular constitution and
history, and on what actions might need to be guided on a given occasion. It is this
relation between perception and belief that makes an empirical investigation of belief of
value to psychology. We therefore examine what existing theories of belief offer.
What does “probability” mean?
The theory of probability is anchored in Kolmogorov’s axioms, but these do not settle
the question of what a probability is. De Finetti (1974) offers a critique of the standard,
frequentist interpretation of probabilities. According to this view, the probability of an
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event is derived from the observed probability of a certain type of event over a large
number of observations or trials. The core assumption is that the frequency of the event
over a long enough series of observations is likely to approximate the frequency of the
event in the world. This account is problematic for several reasons. As De Finetti points
out, the choice of what constitutes a “trial”, as well as what constitutes the event itself,
and the conditions under which observations are made, are all indicative of background
considerations that preclude the possibility of any probability truly being “the”
probability of an event. For this reason De Finetti argues that assessments of probability
are necessarily subjective, and in some sense are objects of cognition rather than features
of the world.
Popper (1935/2002) has similar grounds to object to the frequentist interpretation, but
offers a different type of solution, wherein the probabilistic primitive is a two-place
conditional relationship rather than a one-place frequency. This is a critical move for
understanding how probabilities might be assigned to beliefs: the probability is not the
frequency with which an event occurs, but rather the expected likelihood of that event
given some set of circumstances. Arló-Costa (2000; Arló-Costa & Thomason, 2001)
offers an account of some of the consequences of construing probability in this way.
Building on the work of van Fraassen (1995), he frames the issue in terms of the
mathematics required to make update sensible when an agent’s set of beliefs are
understood as consisting of conditional probabilities in Popper’s sense taken together
with the probability kinematics describing how belief states evolve under new
information. The central issues of this approach are how to make mathematical sense of
full (or absent) belief, and how to appropriately limit the scope of beliefs whose
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associated values are affected by the introduction of new evidence. The latter issue brings
this approach into close contact with the frame problem and the problem of abduction,
both of which are concerns central to the ecological approach.
Though the effort to systematize probabilistic belief update is compelling, it does not
address the concern initially raised in the present body of work. From a psychological
perspective, the effect of perturbing particular beliefs, as in the experimental contexts
described below, is of more immediate interest than a fully general account of belief
update that abstracts away from actual beliefs to unspecified sets of them. This is one
point of departure from formal epistemology. Another is reframing the idea of the
perturbing influence as pressure, as in the Asch paradigm, rather than as new evidence,
as is standard in Bayesian and other probabilistic accounts.
Abduction in theory and practice
One attempt to separate the problem of abduction from the issues of epistemology
turns on Popper’s (1932/2002) distinction between the logic of discovery and the logic of
justification. Popper claimed that the genesis of scientific theories obeyed a different set
of rules than those required to defend theories. Specifically, the defense of theories could
be required to conform to the hypothetico-deductive method, whereas discovery could be
abductive. If abduction belongs to the realm of discovery, then it is not a necessary
feature of a formal account of theory justification or theory change.
Applying the distinction between discovery and justification to accounts of belief
revision highlights further divisions among those concerned with belief. Several
prominent epistemological accounts of belief revision specifically concern revision of
scientific theories (e.g. Alchourrón, Gärdenfors & Makinson, 1985) rather than the belief
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states of individual agents, with which psychological theories are generally concerned.
The distinctions are blurred, however, by psychological experiments whose focus is the
kind of propositional commitments that are also the content of theories (e.g. Elio &
Pelletier). Further, there is a tension between the psychological project of describing how
agents do reason (and perceive, act, and cognize) and the philosophical goal of
prescribing how agents should reason, especially when it comes to the questions of when
available evidence warrants giving up prior commitments, which is a central problem in
theory justification. For an ecological account of belief these distinctions are crucial, as
the commitment to direct realism should entail a collapsing of the prescriptive and the
descriptive when it comes to perceptually-based beliefs: what an agent does perceive is
what the available information specifies for that agent, and is therefore exactly what the
agent should perceive in such a case. This is a strong claim that is implicit in ecological
theory but that is absent from other psychological theories that admit the possibility of
misperception and seek to overcome the destructive mapping between the distal world of
objects and the proximal world of sensations. Although there have been recent moves in
philosophy to connect with behavioral data on problems of cognition, which indicates a
greater degree of overlap between the goals of philosophy and psychology generally,
when comparing accounts of belief revision it is critical to bear in mind the goals and
explananda of each specific attempt.
Do animals reason abductively?
Constructing an ecological theory of belief revision therefore requires keeping in
focus several key points that may be absent from other theories. First, that how agents do
come by their beliefs and perceptions is a proper explanandum of a psychological theory.
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Second, that any such theory must accommodate the behavior of organisms across all
phyla—it cannot use any facts of biology or cognition that are particular to humans (e.g.,
Turvey, in press; Turvey & Carello, 2012). Third, that while deductive reasoning may be
profitably applied in many situations, the capacity that fuels perception and action is
more akin to abduction than to deduction or induction.
Taken together, these concerns point to the necessity of including data from both
animal and human behavior as constraints on theories of any psychological phenomena.
In fact, ecological theory wishes to be a theory true by force of existence, not one true by
force of argument (cf. Shaw, Turvey & Mace, 1982, Turvey, in press). Several results
from animal behavior are of particular interest.
Slime molds (Physarum polycephalum) show preferences for food sources based on
whether the source is in a safe or risky location (dark vs. illuminated) and on how
nutritious the food at a particular location is (percent concentration of oatmeal). They
prefer to seek more nutritious food in less illuminated locations, but if they must choose
between more nutritious food and a safer location, their behavior depends on their degree
of hunger. A well-fed slime mold will choose a safer food source, whereas a starving
slime mold will choose the more nutritive source. But slime molds also show a
behavioral sensitivity to irrelevant options. Where the preference ordering between food
sources is clear, as in the case that there are two equally illuminated food sources, but one
is more nutritive (10% oatmeal) than the other (5% oatmeal), a slime mold will choose
the more rewarding option. But if a third food source is added which should not disrupt
the preference ordering (say, a source with only 1% oatmeal) the slime mold will show an
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even stronger preference for the preferred option (Latty & Beekman, 2010). It is not clear
why this should be the case.
Pigeons have often featured in experiments on operant conditioning. Two such
experiments furnish especially interesting results. Thomas and colleagues (Thomas,
1985; Thomas, Stengel, Sherman, & Woodford, 1987) found that when a pigeon is
trained to key peck in response to colored lights, changing the angle of inclination of the
floor on which the bird is standing disrupts the conditioned behavior. A seemingly
irrelevant variable, which is not apparently related to the targeted behavior, turns out to
have specific consequences for the animal. Herbranson and Schroeder (2010), also
working with pigeons (Columba livia), discovered that pigeons are not susceptible to an
error humans make systematically in the Monty Hall paradigm (which is described in
detail below). In the Monty Hall scenario, the chance of winning a prize concealed
behind one of three doors is always maximized by a willingness to switch from a door
initially chosen (when there is a one-in-three chance of choosing the door concealing the
prize) to the door remaining after one of the two initially unselected doors is opened to
show that it does not conceal the prize. While humans systematically fail to behave
optimally in Monty Hall scenarios, Herbranson and Schroeder trained pigeons to respond
to a three-door Monty Hall problem. After several days of trials the pigeons reliably
switched their door choices, thus maximizing their chances of getting the prize (in this
case, access to food). These results call for a reformulation of the problems under
discussion. One consideration is the possibility that the difference in performance
observed between humans and pigeons is due not to any differences in cognitive
machinery but to the differences in the training period. Humans may have fewer than 100
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trials to learn MHD strategies (Granberg, 1999), whereas the pigeons in Herbranson and
Schroeder’s experiment were trained over a 30-day period. Another possibility is that
food, being more biologically salient, provides a more effective framework for
discovering MHD strategies. Miller and Matute (1996) found that in conditioning
experiments, rats exhibit backward blocking (decrease in response when exposed to a
previously conditioned stimulus) when the target stimuli have low biological significance
that is not observed with target stimuli of high biological significance. In other words, the
significance of the potential prize may change the effectiveness of training the strategy.
A final example of contextual activity is provided by jumping spiders (Portia
labiata). Tarsitano and Andrew (1999) found that jumping spiders are able to visually
distinguish between routes to a target that are complete and routes that have gaps and are
impassable to the spiders. When the spiders had a choice of two complete routes they
showed no preference in selecting between them, but when one complete route and one
incomplete route were available the spiders chose the complete route, regardless of what
direction of travel the complete route lay in. Jackson et al. (2002) found that jumping
spiders make risk assessments in pursuing spitting spiders, which are both predator and
prey for the jumping spiders. The spitting spiders in the experiment (Scytodes pallidus)
are less likely to spit when they are carrying eggs, which are held in front of the mouth.
They are therefore less dangerous when carrying eggs. Jumping spiders attempting to
prey upon egg-laden spitting spiders were more likely to take a direct route to reach their
intended prey, while jumping spiders pursuing spiders not burdened with eggs were more
likely to attempt to approach their prey from behind.
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What is of interest in these cases is not just that the behaviors demonstrated are
relatively complex. Rather, what is most notable is that in each case the relatively
complex behavior is produced by an organism with relatively simple neural machinery.
This raises the possibility that instances of what is considered high-level abstract
reasoning (abduction, risk assessment) may actually be instances of something based in
perceptual, not cognitive, machinery.
Do humans behave rationally?
Non-human organisms may perform in surprising fashion when confronted with what
seem to be cognitive tasks, but it is also the case that humans often do not live up to
expectations in tasks that require certain kinds of reasoning. The philosophical literature
is rife with instances of humans’ failure to make rational or logically consistent choices
when confronted with certain problems. There are several types of hypothesis one could
espouse with respect to an explanation of these failures. One is that precision in such
cases is too computationally burdensome, and the heuristics that are employed instead
lead to imprecise results under certain conditions. Another, related, explanation is that the
contingent history of problems confronted and dealt with on an evolutionary scale has led
to inefficiencies that are exploitable but rarely have survival consequences. In either case
examining the gap between what human agents do and what they “ought” to do if they
behaved rationally may offer insights as to the actual character of cognition. For the
purposes of the current discussion two examples will be sufficient illustration.
MHD is a classic example of flagrant and persistent failure to act in accordance with
the rules of probability. On the game show Let’s Make a Deal, the host (Monty Hall)
would offer a contestant the choice of opening one of three doors on stage. Behind one of
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the door lay a desirable prize such as a car, and behind the other two were (presumably
less-desirable) goats. Upon the selection of a door, Monty Hall would show the
contestant what was behind one of the two unselected doors. Importantly, he would
always choose to open a “goat” door. He would then offer the contestant the chance to
switch their pick from their originally chosen door to the remaining unselected door.
Probabilistically, a contestant always maximizes their chances of winning the car by
switching their pick, yet in experiments that follow this paradigm, people seldom choose
to switch. In fact, many people resist the logic of switching even after it is demonstrated
or explained to them that switching is always the better bet. This unintuitive result
requires an explanation in an account of human reasoning.
Abduction and ecological reliability
What can be gleaned from the discussions above? One possible conclusion that can
be drawn centers on the evidence available for addressing a situation. The expectation of
what a rational agent will do on some occasion may require certain types of information
not usually present, or may hinge on the way in which information is presented. This is
the essence of Baratgin and Politzer’s discussion of MHD – the context of the situation
makes a great deal of difference to the approach one takes. The same lesson is present in
the findings of Latty and Beekman. In these cases the context that confronts the organism
results in different patterns of behavior.
Problems like MHD hinge essentially on discovering the correct description of a
situation so that an agent confronted with the situation will behave rationally: that
features which should be distinct are not conflated and vice versa, that precise strategies
and heuristics are not employed erroneously. The conviction that lies behind much of the

Experimentally Induced Bias 27
literature seems to be that a whole-truth-and-nothing-but-the-truth description will yield
rational behavior, and that where rational behavior is not observed it is as a result of a
failure to achieve the correct understanding of the matter at hand.
These findings are in keeping with the ecological standpoint. Action is underwritten
by perception, and perception is founded on available information and the specifying
relations that obtain in a state of affairs. Nothing else is possible. If an additional fact or
set of facts would change an organism’s behavior, but those facts aren’t available in that
situation, or a distinction might be made on some basis, but that distinction isn’t specified
for the organism, it’s fruitless to say the organism isn’t behaving rationally. The
neighborhood of ecologically reliable relations may not be the only description available,
but it is the only neighborhood an organism’s perceptions will allow it to navigate.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 1
The considerations identified in Chapters 1-3 formed the basis for Experiment 1.
Those considerations, as they bear specifically on Experiments 1 and 2, are schematized
in Figure 1. Participants were presented with a forced-choice line judgment task,
administered in two parts. In Phase 1, 400 pairs of lines oriented horizontally were
presented on a laptop monitor, one pair at a time. Participants were asked to choose
which line in the pair was longer, and to register their confidence in their choice. They
responded by using the laptop trackpad to click on the screen. Both responses were given
simultaneously—the choice of line by which side of the screen participants clicked on,
and the confidence by the click location’s horizontal distance from the center of the
screen. In this way participants’ responses allow for an assessment of both species of
belief under discussion (see Chapter 2): (a) the choice of longer line constitutes a
participant’s disposition to behave as though something is the case, e.g. to act in
accordance with the belief that the left line is longer; (b) the degree of confidence in the
choice provides insight into the extent of the disconnect between the disposition to act
and the willingness to assent to a proposition, e.g. “I believe that the left line is longer”.
Importantly, a participant’s response on one measure is independent of their response on
the other—it is possible for the participant to make a choice and have very little
confidence in the choice.
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Figure 1. Schematic of experimental paradigm in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Participants click on the
side of the screen with the line they think is longer. Participants rate their confidence on each judgment
with distance of leftward click (solid arrow) or rightward click (dashed arrow) away from screen center.
Key elements: Participant judges lines, reports confidence; experimenter biases lines (e.g. %L > %R),
manipulates “score”.

Intuitively, choosing which of a pair of lines is longer is not a task about which there
may be much doubt, if the lines differ sufficiently. Therefore, half of the presented pairs
differed by less than a JND, so as to provide participants with opportunities for doubt.
The JND for line length had been well established experimentally as being approximately
three-hundredths (.03) of the length of a reference line. However, initial attempts using
that value yielded results indicating that participants performed better than expected,
indicating that they were able to perceive smaller differences in line lengths. Different
values were tried, until pre-pilot volunteers’ performance was equal to chance, a value of
.019 times the reference length.
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As noted, the experimental design is a conceptual extension of the Asch (1955)
paradigm. Participants in Experiment 1 experienced pressure on their beliefs, in the form
of “score” applied on the less-than-JND trials during Phase 1 of the experiment (see
Chapter 2). To reiterate, “score” was designed to introduce a disposition to respond that
the left line was longer or that the right line was longer (see Figure 1).
Participants
Participants were 15 graduate students from the University of Connecticut who
volunteered to participate. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups,
left-biased (Group L, 8 participants) or right-biased (Group R, 7 participants).
Stimuli and procedure
The line pairs were of two kinds, less than a JND difference and more than a JND
difference. There were 280 instances of the former kind and 220 instances of the latter
kind. Participants viewed the line-pair stimuli (generated by a Matlab program) on a
MacBook laptop. They used the laptop trackpad to guide an onscreen cursor in order to
make their responses (see Chapter 2 for details).
Design
Following the basic methodology introduced in Chapter 2, Phase 1 and Phase 2 (there
was no Phase 0) were defined over five blocks of 100 trials: Blocks 1-4 with bias and
“score” (Phase 1), and Block 5 without “score” and with bias reversed (Phase 2). For
Group L in Phase 1, 80% of the line pairs were left-line-longer. For Group R in Phase 1,
80% of the line pairs were right-line-longer. “Score” incremented or decremented
according to the following rule: For Group L, whenever a participant clicked on the left
side of the screen (indicating a left-line-longer choice), “score” for the participant, with
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probability .8, would increase by 10 points on that trial, regardless of whether the left line
was actually longer on that trial. If the participant clicked on the right (indicating a rightline-longer choice), then with a probability of .2 the participant’s score would increase by
10, again regardless of which line was longer. Mutatis mutandis, for Group R, “score” for
the participant incremented by 10 with probability .8 for right clicks and probability .2 for
left clicks.
“Score” decremented whenever it did not increment. Crucially for the experiment,
“score” only changed on less-than-JND trials. On greater-than-JND trials “score”
remained unchanged from the most recent less-than-JND trial. This was done to maintain
the plausibility of “score”, which was targeted only at those line pairs where the fact of
the matter could be in doubt.
Phase 2 of the experiment, Block 5, consisted of an additional 100 horizontally
oriented line pairs. It was distinguished from Phase 1 by the absence of “score”. It was
further distinguished by a different bias, a different proportion of left-line longer pairs.
For Group L, the pairs on Block 5 were 30% left-line-longer. For Group R, the pairs in
Block 5 were 30% right-line-longer. The proportions were changed in order to determine
whether the bias introduced would persist in the absence of “score”. A reversal of
proportion was chosen, instead of presenting an unbiased block, in order to make
distinguishable whether participants responded in keeping with the stimulus properties, in
keeping with the bias introduced in Phase I, or in keeping with a guessing strategy.
Finally, the proportion of less-than-JND pairs was increased on Block 5 from 50% to
80%, in order to provide more of the trials of interest.
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Results and Discussion
Left-line clicking. This measure indexes the influence of the bias that distinguished
Groups L and R. Figure 2 shows that the number of left-line clicks varied systematically
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as a function of Group, Block, and JND, F(4, 52) = 23.47, p < .0001, η2 = .08.
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Figure 2. Left clicks as a function of Block, Group (squares Group L, circles Group R) and JND (open <
JND, closed > JND) in Experiment 1.

Accuracy and confidence. Figure 3 compares performance accuracy with performance
confidence (measured in pixels; see Chapter 2). Inspection of the accuracy data suggests
indifference to both Group and Block (Fs < 1) for both levels of JND. In comparison,
inspection of the unsigned confidence data (lower panel) suggests a decline with Block,
F(4, 52) = 3.47, p < .014, η2 = .046, a decline that was at the same rate for both Group L
and Group R.
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Figure 3. (Left) Mean Correct Responses and (Right) Mean Confidence Measure as functions of Block,
Group and JND in Experiment 1.
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Latency. Figure 4 shows that latency of responding declined with Block, F(4, 13) =
9.46, p < .001, η2 = .16, and did so at a faster rate for JND > 1, F(4, 52) = 10.76, p <
.0001, η2 = .028.

Figure 4. Latency of choice as a function of Block and JND in Experiment 1.

If participants respond based on stimulus properties alone, one would expect to see
the present distributions reflected in the greater-than-JND trials (participants correctly
choosing the longer lines) and responding with equal probability on the left and right in
the less-than-JND trials (guessing). If “score” affected participants’ disposition to act
(choice of longer line), one would expect that participants would respond in accordance
with “score” on the less-than-JND trials. If “score” affected participants’ assent to a
belief that a particular line is longer, one would expect participants’ confidence in the
judgments made to vary with whether or not the response agreed with the disposition
introduced by “score” (higher confidence in responses concurring with “score”, lower
confidence in responses opposing “score”).
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Generally, results indicated that the introduction of “score” was sufficient to alter
participants’ responses over the course of Phase 1, and that the effect persisted somewhat
in Phase 2. Though the Phase 2 left-click frequencies differed, the particular aftereffect
that the bias introduced in Phase 1 might have had could not be revealed using ANOVA.
Experiment 1 was aimed at fulfilling several criteria for an empirical investigation of
belief. First, it attempted to elicit responses on two separate construals of belief—belief
as assent and belief as action. Second, it incorporated stimuli with probabilistic
properties, as a means of assessing the empirical adequacy of probabilistic models of
belief and belief change, which are common in both psychology and epistemology. Third,
it constituted a step toward drawing a connection between the Asch study, which has
been primarily discussed in the context of social influence on behavior, and a perceptionaction perspective whereby behavior may be influenced by many types of conditioning,
learning, and more-or-less reliable information.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 extended Experiment 1 to include Phase 0 in the form of a single block
of 100-pairs presented without a bias and in the absence of “score”. Its purpose was to
establish participants’ baseline rates of clicking on the left and right sides of the screen.
Experiment 2 also expanded Phase 2 of Experiment 1 from one block to three blocks of
50 trials. Additional modifications included a three bins classification of JND (less-thanJND, greater-than-JND, and a range from 0.5JND to 2.5JND identified in the figures as
approximately 1JND) and changing the Phase 2 frequencies of Experiment 1 to 50%
right- and left-line-longer pairs for both groups. The reclassification of trials into three
JND bins was motivated by the method of determining the value of the JND for line
length used throughout the experiment. The JND value established in pilot work was the
value where participants performed equal to chance, rather than a hard cut-off. This
raised the question of whether some of the variance in the effect of the line length
difference might be missed by treating the line pairs as strictly above- or below-JND, and
a slightly finer-grained analysis was therefore employed. The Phase 2 frequencies were
changed from the frequencies used in Experiment 1 because the analysis of Experiment 1
showed no convincing reason why the two groups should be treated separately in Phase
2. Experiment 2 was conducted using the same Matlab program that was used for
Experiment 1, with modifications as described below.
Participants and procedure
Participants were 30 undergraduate students from the University of Connecticut who
received course credit for participation. All participants completed the Edinburgh
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Handedness Inventory before beginning the experiment. This constituted the only
demographic information collected from the participants. Participants were randomly
assigned to either the left-biased (Group L) or right-biased (Group R) condition.
Apparatus and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1.
Design
There were eight blocks, one in Phase 0, four in Phase 1, and three in Phase 2. In
Block 1 100 line-pairs were presented, unbiased (50% of pairs were left-line-longer, 50%
of pairs differed by less than the JND) and without “score”. Blocks 2-5 were the same as
in Experiment 1, with each block containing 100 line pairs, of which 50% were belowJND and either 20% (right-biased group) or 70% (left-biased group) of line pairs were
left-line-longer, and in which participants received “score”. In contrast, Blocks 6-8
consisted of 50 line-pairs without bias and without score.
Results
Several analyses with somewhat different foci were applied to the data. The initial
analysis took the form of four parallel 2 (Group) × 8 (Block) × 3 (Well-above, Justabove- or Below-JND) ANOVAs conducted on the dependent measures of latency,
confidence, correct responses, and number of responses on the left side of the screen (a
measure of the efficacy of the introduced bias).
Latency. Neither the main effect of group nor any interaction with group was
significant, Fs ≈ 1. The main effect of JND, F(2, 56) = 22.65, p < .0001, η2 = .06,
indicates that latencies were shorter when the two lines were obviously different in length
(M = 1.63 s) than when they were close in length (M = 2.02 s and 1.99 s for just below
and just above the JND). The main effect of block, F(7, 196) = 23.00, p < .0001, η2 = .23,
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indicates that latencies became shorter with experience in the task but with a slight
lengthening when “score” was no longer provided. The Block × JND interaction, F(14,
392) = 3.15, p < .0001, η2 = .008, indicates that the latency difference across differing
JND trials diminished with experience in the task, again with a slight increase when
“score” was first eliminated.
Signed Confidence. Confidence was measured in screen pixels, with sign indicating
left (–) or right (+) and size indicating confidence in that judgment. Because of the sign
difference, the main effects of group, F(1, 28) = 6.33, p = .018, η2 = .11, and JND, F(2,
56) = 5.49, p = .007, η2 = .024, should be interpreted in light of their interaction, F(2, 56)
= 14.46, p < .0001, η2 = .064. In particular, confidence was highest—clicks were farther
left or farther right—when line lengths were most distinct. The main effect of block was
significant, F(7, 196) = 4.63, p < .0001, η2 = .05, as were its interactions with group, F(7,
196) = 11.89, p < .0001, η2 = .13, and with JND, F(14, 392) = 5.24, p < .0001, η2 = .058.
The Block × Group × JND interaction, F(14, 392) = 6.16, p < .0001, η2 = .07, indicates
that confidence was diminished for blocks without “score”, especially when lines were
close in length.
Correct Responses. The main effects for group and block were not significant. The
main effect of JND, F(2, 28) = 291.5, p < .0001, η2 = .9, indicates that participants made
more correct responses on the well-above-JND trials (M = .9, SD = .12) than on the
below- (M = .54, SD = .13) and just-above-JND trials (M = .6, SD = .11). The JND ×
Block interaction, F(14, 392) = 2.54, p < .01, η2 = .017, indicates that while the
proportion of correct responses remains higher for the well-above-JND trials throughout
the experiment, the proportions of correct responses for the just-above-JND and below-
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JND trials are initially different but converge over the course of Phase 1 of the
experiment before once again diverging in Phase 2. Figure 5 summarizes the results for
accuracy and (absolute) confidence.

Figure 5. Accuracy (Top) and Confidence (bottom) as a function of Block and JND in Experiment 2.

Left-line clicking. The main effect of group, F(1, 28) = 9.54, p = .0045, η2 = .37,
indicates a higher proportion of left-line clicks for Group L (M = .57) than Group R (M =
.41). The main effect of JND, F(2, 56) = 4.68, p = .013, η2 = .032, indicates a higher
proportion of left responses when line lengths were less distinct (M = .51 and M =.50 vs.
M = .46). The main effect of block, F(7, 196) = 5.83, p < .0001, η2 = .106, indicates that
the proportion of left responses diminished with experience in the task but with a
resurgence when “score” was no longer provided. The Block × JND interaction, F(14,
392) = 4.70, p < .0001, η2 = .066, indicates that the resurgence was due to different
patterns as a function of JND level: The proportion of left responses shot up for distinct
lines pairs and then diminished again but for the close-to-JND pairs it gradually
increased. Finally, the Block × Group × JND interaction, F(14, 392) = 6.46, p < .0001, η2
= .09, indicates that the diminishing of left responses was due to Group R when a score
was provided, and to the farthest from JND levels when the score was no longer
provided.
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Figure 6. Proportion of clicks on the left line as a function of Group and Phase in Experiment 2. (Phase 0 –
Block 1; Phase 1 – Blocks 2-5; Phase 2 – Blocks 6-8)

All of the above outcomes can be conveniently communicated by a focus on Phase. A
minimalist analysis takes Block 1 as representative (obviously) of Phase 0, Block 2 as
representative of Phase 1, and Block 6 as representative of Phase 2. Figures 6-8 present
the results in terms of the foregoing phases.

Figure 7. Accuracy (proportion correct) as a function of Phase and JND (binned) in Experiment 2.

The important interactions are (a) Group × Phase, F(2, 56) = 15.6, p < .001, for Leftside clicking (demonstrating that the manipulations of bias and “score” worked, see
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Figure 6), (b) JND × Phase, F(4, 112) = 3.9, p < .005, for proportion correct (Figure 7),
suggesting that accuracy depended on phase (alias context), and (c) JND × Phase, F(4,
112) = 9.05, p < .0001, for confidence, suggesting that confidence declined from Phase 0
to Phase 2 in a JND-dependent way (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Confidence as a function of Phase and JND (binned) in Experiment 2.

Discussion
Each of the behavioral aspects reported (latency, confidence, left-side clicking, and
correct responses) carries a different part of the experimental hypothesis. The proportion
of correct responses is informative about the extent to which participants are successful
with respect to the stimuli: that is, whether they accurately perceived the difference in
line lengths. The proportion of left responses is informative about whether the
manipulation was successful: that is, whether participants responded in keeping with the
bias introduced in Phase 1. (For the two preceding forms of successful, refer to “Key
elements” in Figure 1.) If the manipulation were not successful, the expectation would be
that participants would respond on the side with the longer line in the above-JND trials
but would respond with equal likelihood on the left and right in the below-JND trials
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(essentially, they would guess). A successful manipulation, however, should bias the
participants toward responding on either the left (Group L) or the right (Group R),
especially in the below-JND cases. Taken together, the proportion correct and the
proportion of left responses represent the species of belief that is more overt: the
disposition to act as though a state of affairs obtains.
Confidence is, naturally enough, informative of the participants’ confidence in their
responses: how sure they are that the action they undertake on each trial is the
appropriate one. Latency provides a more subtle measure of confidence, one that is not
generated consciously by the participants. The latency measure also goes some way
towards teasing apart participants whose average confidence is low because their
confidence is low (in which case latency would be expected to be large) and participants
whose average confidence is low because they are using a relatively narrow range of the
confidence measure (in which case latency would be expected to be smaller). Taken
together, confidence and latency represent the species of belief that is propositional:
holding that a proposition is true, or being prepared to assent to a proposition such as “I
believe that the left line in this pair is longer”. Because confidence is a continuous
measure it is in keeping with the idea of propositional beliefs as being the sorts of things
that carry weights.
Throughout the experiment Group L made significantly more left responses than
Group R. This demonstrates that the primary stimulus manipulation is effective:
participants are capable of responding in keeping with the stimulus properties. Further,
the significant difference between groups of the number of left responses on the below-
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JND and near-JND trials indicates that the introduced bias affects responses in the cases
where what response is correct is not obvious.
A less straightforward pattern of left responses is observed when taking Block into
account. Throughout Phase 1 (Blocks 2 through 5) Group L participants responded more
on the left, while Group R participants responded more on the right. In Phase 2 (Blocks 6
through 8), however, Group L’s rate of responding on the left decreased smoothly, while
Group R showed a different pattern: in Block 6, Group R began to respond on the left. In
Blocks 7 and 8 Group R’s responses on the right again increased. The effect of the
manipulation was therefore successful (participants responded on the side to which they
were being biased), but more complex than expected. The pattern of responses made by
Group R bears a similarity to responses observed in prism experiments (see Blau,
Stephen, Frank, & Turvey, 2009), wherein an effect of an adaptation to context is
observed while the context is present, and a rebound effect is observed when the context
is removed. While this phenomenon may be of like kind, no explanation for why the
effect should be observed in Group R but not Group L immediately suggests itself. One
possibility, briefly considered in Experiment 2A (below), is that handedness plays a role
in differentiating responses on the right side of the screen from responses on the left, and
may constitute an additional effect of context.
In keeping with the main conceptual argument—that belief as the basis for action and
belief as a proposition to which assent or a weighted assent might be assigned—
confidence and the proportion of correct responses are best interpreted together. Whether
a correct response is given is the experimental measure of belief as the basis for action,
while the confidence rating is the measure of the degree of assent to the proposition
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represented by the line length judgment given on a trial. Rates of correct responses are
highest for the above-JND condition, though they are not perfect. This indicates that even
for obviously different line-pairs errors are still made. The lack of an effect of block
indicates that rates of correct response also remained fairly constant throughout the
experiment, though the significant interaction of JND and block shows that, while the
below-JND and near-JND trials were initially treated as different by the participants, as
the experiment went on they became more similar.
Unsurprisingly, confidence ratings were highest for the above-JND trials, where the
line differences were distinct. However, confidence ratings decreased for all JND bins
throughout the experiment. In particular, confidence decreased in Phase 2, when score
was removed. This is particularly interesting when considered in tandem with the fact
that the proportion of correct responses remained fairly constant across the entire
experiment. These two results support several of the intuitions whose investigation
motivated the present experiments. Most importantly, these results indicate that it is
possible to experimentally distinguish between an action and the actor’s confidence. It is
this component that was not part of Asch’s (1951, 1956) data, but which on our reading
of the dual nature of belief is critical to understanding the way in which propositional
beliefs are not fully determinative of action.
Finally, the results for latency indicate straightforwardly that participants are quicker
to respond to more distinct stimuli, and their responses are given more quickly as the
experiment progresses, presumably as a result of increased facility with the experiment.
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EXPERIMENT 2A
Experiment 2 revealed a clear distinction in consistency of observed data between the
left-biased and right-biased groups. Participants in the left-biasing group showed less
within-group variation in terms of bias-side click frequency than participants in the rightbiasing group. Because the preponderance of participants in Experiment 2 was righthanded, a first hypothesis was that the left-biasing condition constituted greater pressure
on participants, perhaps moving them through a phase transition. Moving across the
midline of the body is more effortful (Rosenbaum, van Heugten, & Caldwell, 1996), and
right handed participants using their right hand to interface with the computer via the
touchpad experience less of this effort in moving the cursor to or on the right side of the
screen than moving the cursor to or on the left side of the screen. To test this hypothesis
five left-handed participants were recruited. Each participant in this left-handed subgroup
was instructed to use their left hand to interface with the touchpad regardless of which
hand they would ordinarily use. All of the left-handed subgroup completed the rightbiasing condition of the experiment. Their results serve as a contrast to the largely righthanded participants from Experiment 2. Because this subgroup was being biased to move
across the midline of the body, the frequencies of their bias-side clicks were conjectured
to more closely resemble the left-biased group from Experiment 2. The data did not offer
any substantive support for the conjecture. It is noteworthy that some participants
reported spontaneously that they ordinarily used their right hands for computer mice. On
questioning, all concurred that right hand usage was the norm and was apparently so in
this small group even for those who scored strongly left-handed on the Edinburgh
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Handedness Inventory. The reason for commonplace right hand usage at the computer is
that this is a standard setup in many school and work environments.

EXPERIMENT 2B
In an additional attempt to clarify the potential handedness factor in Experiment 2, a
version of the experiment was conducted with vertically-oriented lines stacked on top of
each other, wherein participants responded using the top and bottom of the screen rather
than the left and right sides. Five participants were tested. The results did not suggest any
obvious difference between performance in this up-down arrangement and the
performance in the left-right arrangement of the main experiment. Both performances
might be regarded as reflections of the kind of phenomena studied under the label “S-R
compatibility”.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 was a version of the Monty Hall dilemma (MHD). In the classic Monty
Hall, players are confronted with a scenario in which they must choose between three
doors, two of which conceal “goats” (undesirable prizes), and one of which conceals a
“car” (a desirable prize). Though they do not see what’s behind the door they choose at
the outset, they are shown what’s behind one of the remaining two doors. Per the rules of
the game, the door that is opened is always shown to be a “goat” door. The player then
has the opportunity to switch their pick to the remaining unopened door (“switching”) or
to stay with their original door choice (“sticking”).
Famously, the “winningest” strategy to resolve MHD is to switch. Equally famously,
sticking is by far the more popular strategy (see e.g. Granberg, 1999). In fact, the sticking
strategy is so entrenched that even when the optimal strategy is explained people resist
believing it. The explanation of the winning strategy is as follows: Initially, the
probability that the prize lies behind any given door is 1/3. Therefore the initial choice of
door may as well be made at random. The probability that the prize lies behind one of the
unchosen doors is 2/3. In the second stage of the scenario, as the “goat” door is opened,
the probability that the remaining unchosen door is the “car” door has essentially doubled
due to the removal of the other unchosen door as a possibility. But the probability of the
first door remains unchanged, as no new information about it has been introduced by the
opening of the “goat” door. Therefore the remaining unchosen door has a higher
probability at the end of the scenario of being the “car” door, even though the
probabilities are equal at the outset.
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Baratgin and Politzer (2010) advanced the hypothesis that both the dilemma and the
resistance to the winning strategy are rooted in the manner in which information is
presented throughout the scenario. They argue that the opening of the “goat” door is
taken to be relevant to the overall probabilities, and that players do not effectively isolate
the new information to the real space of outcomes, which includes only the unchosen
doors. They presented several versions of MHD and concluded that when information is
presented as being relevant only to the unchosen doors, people do not commit the typical
MHD error. Granberg (1999) tested a 4-door version of MHD with unequal probabilities,
where the optimal strategy is to choose the lowest probability door initially and then
switch to the highest probability door remaining after the reveal stage. Participants in
Granberg’s study were explicitly informed of the door probabilities on each trial, yet even
so no participants reliably used the optimal strategy.
MHD presents a classic problem in biased reasoning. Because it has straightforward
probabilities and a well-understood set of strategies it provides a good starting point for
an experiment investigating the effect of introducing bias, thereby altering the probability
distribution of stimuli. In that sense it provides an extension of Experiments 1 and 2. In
order to more closely tie MHD to the first two experiments, we constructed a version
conditioned on a perceptual task—in this case, color discrimination.
Method
Participants. Ten undergraduate students (mean age = 22.4, 5 male, 5 female) from
the University of Connecticut participated in the experiment. They received either $10 or
course credit for participating. All participants completed the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory, which categorized all participants as right-handed.
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Materials. Participants viewed MHD stimuli on a MacBook laptop. They used the
laptop trackpad to guide an onscreen pointer in order to make their responses.
Design. Experiment 3 used stimuli presented to participants using a webpage
designed with Adobe Flash. It consisted of a modified MHD, using a standard 3-door
case. Behind each door was a square colored a different shade of red. The red values were
randomly generated from a range of RGB values. The “prize” was the brightest of the
three shades of red generated on each trial. Although a line-length version of MHD was
considered, pilot work indicated that the range of indiscriminability around the JND,
which was an advantage in Experiments 1 and 2, made it too difficult for participants to
find the “prize” lines and discover MHD strategies. Color was therefore chosen as a
stimulus property that is both salient to participants and easy to program. While the
standard MHD has a unique “prize” and two identical “goats”, i.e. losing choices, the
version of the MHD employed for this experiment had 3 distinct stimuli. This was done
because participants were making comparative rather than categorical judgments, though
it may have affected the outcome of the experiment (discussed below).
Experiment 3 had the same structure as Experiment 2: an initial 100-trial block with
an equal chance of the “prize” being behind each of three doors, followed by 4 100-trial
blocks with unequal probabilities of the “prize” being behind each of the doors, and 3 50trial blocks with equal probabilities. In the unequal-probabilities blocks (Blocks 2
through 5, composing Phase 1), either the leftmost or rightmost door had a higher chance
of concealing the “prize”. Participants were randomly assigned to either the left-biased
(Group L) or right-biased (Group R) condition. Participants were asked both to select a
door by clicking on it, and also to register their confidence in their choice, measured in
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how far from the center of the chosen square in any direction they clicked, while still
making the response within the confines of the door. This lack of directionality was
included specifically to avoid the sort of laterality effects that were observed in
Experiments 1 and 2, and also to simplify the verbal instructions to the participants. The
center represented the highest possible confidence and the inside edge of the door
represented the lowest confidence. In all there were 650 trials for each participant.
Procedure. Before beginning the experiment participants saw an instruction screen,
and were told that they could begin the experiment by clicking anywhere on the screen.
Each individual trial consisted of an instance of MHD, as follows: three “doors” (square
boxes) were displayed on screen, along with the text prompt “Select a door”. A
participant would click on one box, whereupon the color behind one of the remaining
doors (never the prize door) would be revealed. The participant would then be asked to
stick or switch, via the text prompt: “Switch your pick?” They would then either switch
(by clicking on the unopened door they did not originally choose) or stick (by once again
clicking on the originally-chosen door). The color behind the door they ultimately chose
would then be revealed, along with text telling them either “You win” or “You lose”
depending on the outcome of their final choice. At the end of the experiment participants
were asked to briefly describe any strategy they might have employed in the course of the
experiment.
Results
The focus was on the pattern of the 1st and 2nd responses comprising a trial. A 2
(Response) × 2 (Group) × 8 (Block) ANOVA was conducted on the confidence measure
(derived as a distance from the center of the screen). This distance was a shallow U-
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shaped function of block for both responses, F(7, 56) = 3.54, p = .003, η2 = .073. No
other main effects or interactions reached significance, all Fs ≈ 1 except the Block ×
Group interaction, F(7, 56) = 1.61, p > .15, η2 = .033.
A parallel ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of correct 1st and 2nd responses.
As shown in Figure 9, the main effect of Response, F(1, 8) = 12.30, p = .008, η2 = .41,
indicates a higher proportion of correct 2nd responses (M = .66) than 1st responses (M =
.42). The main effect of block on proportion correct, F(7, 56) = 10.09, p < .0001, η2 = .4,
was realized as an inverted U-shaped function of block. No other main effects or
interactions reached significance.

Figure 9. Correct 1st and 2nd responses in a MHD trial as a function of Block.

In a trial the 2nd response may repeat the 1st response (a case of hold) or not (a case of
switch). A 2 (Hold) × 2 (Group) × 8 (Block) ANOVA was conducted on the distance of
response from center, as an indicator of confidence. The distance measure associated with
the 2nd response (hold or switch) was a shallow U-shaped function of Block, F(7, 49) =
2.43, p = .032, η2 = .081 (Figure 10 left). No other main effects or interactions reached
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significance. A parallel ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of correct holds and
switches. Of the two strategies, switch (M = .68) was associated with a higher proportion
of correct responses to MHD than hold (M = .44), F(1, 7) = 5.62, p = .05, η2 = .37
(Figure 10 right).

Figure 10. Confidence (left) and accuracy (right) in the MHD task as a function of Block and Strategy
(hold where 2nd response = 1st response, or switch where 2nd response ≠ 1st response.

A Block × Hold interaction, F(7, 49) = 2.71, p = .019, η2 = .172, suggests that the Block
effect characterized only those trials when participants remained with their first choice (F
= 9.70, p < .0001). The proportion of correct 2nd responses on those trials in which
participants switched from the 1st response was unaffected by Block (F < 1) remaining
high across Blocks 1-8. The main effect of group, Group L versus Group R, was not
significant, F ≈ 1. The effect of group was seen in the interaction with block, F(7, 49) =
2.91, p = .013, η2 = .12, as Figure 11 makes evident: the inverted U-function was more
characteristic of Group R. No other interactions reached significance, Fs < 1.
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Figure 11. Accuracy in the MHD task as a function of Group and Block.

A 2 (1st and 2nd response) × 2 (Group) × 8 (Block) ANOVA was conducted on the
choice of door (1 = left, 2 = middle, 3 = right). The results are shown in Figure 12. The
main effect of group, F(1, 8) = 21.39, p = .0017, indicates that Group L was more likely
than Group R to choose the left door (M = 1.58 vs. M = 2.20). The main effects of Trial
and Block were not significant, Fs ≈ 1, but their effects were seen in interactions. The
Block × Group interaction, F(7, 56) = 16.56, p < .0001, indicates a strong directional bias
to the unequal-probabilities blocks. The marginal Response × Block interaction, F(1, 8) =
4.59, p = .065, and the significant Response × Group × Block interaction, F(7, 56) = 2.90,
p = .012, indicate that the directional bias during the unequal-probabilities blocks is
stronger on the second response. This characterization was verified with post hoc t-tests
(df = 8, p = .05 requires t > 2.3). There was no directional bias for the first responses of
Blocks 1, 7, and 8, |t| < 1; the first responses of Blocks 2 through 6 showed a directional
bias (t = -2.81, -2.42, -2.43, p < .05; -1.78, -1.33, p > .05). For the second responses,
Block 1 showed a directional bias in the opposite direction, t = 3.23, p = .012. The second
responses of Blocks 2 through 7 showed a directional bias (t = -7.38, -8.75, -7.04, -16.64,
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p = .0001; -1.31, p > .05; -3.12, p = .014). The directional bias was eliminated on Block
8, |t| < 1.

Door chosen

3

Left 1st
Left 2nd
Right 1st
Right 2nd

2

1
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Block
Figure 12. 1st and 2nd response as a function of Group and Block in Experiment 3.

Participants were characterized as ‘holders’ or ‘switchers’ by dividing them into
quartiles based on the percentage of trials per block on which they switched. This was
used as the basis for an ANOVA comparing the quartiles on confidence and proportion of
correct responses. For the purposes of this ANOVA, only 2nd responses were included.
Switch quartile significantly affected performance, F(3, 76) = 4.698, p < .01, η2 = .156,
but did not significantly affect confidence. Participant blocks falling into the lowest
quartile (fewest switch trials) had the highest performance (M = 67.4, SD = 29.3). These
values did not significantly differ from the performance of those in the highest quartile
(most switch trials), which had the next highest performance (M = 63.7, SD = 27.3). Post
hoc analyses showed that these blocks differed significantly only from the second
quartile, p < .01.
Discussion
The winning MHD strategy is switching, but as described above, a preponderance of
players not only fail to discover or employ this strategy, but resist acknowledging that it
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is better even after having it explained. As Granberg (1999) reported, in an unequalprobabilities MHD the best strategy is even less obvious: to optimize the chances of
winning a player should initially select a low-probability door and then switch to the
highest remaining probability door after a “goat” has been revealed. In the equalprobabilities case, participants may only adopt two strategies: holding or switching. In the
unequal-probabilities case, there are four potential strategies that a participant might be
expected to adopt (see Table 1). The strategies shown in the top two rows of the table are
parallel to those available in the standard MHD (hold and switch), but the outcomes are
particular to the unequal-probabilities variant. Those in the bottom two rows of the table
are unique to the unequal-probabilities MHD. The principal difference in strategy
between the two versions of the dilemma is that in the standard case, there is no
advantage to initially selecting one door over another. Players therefore begin with a
random door selection, and the win probabilities associated with each strategy are not
dependent on which door is selected. In the unequal-probabilities case, if the player
chooses at random (that is, does not choose on the basis of an assessment of the door win
probabilities), then a given turn, from the player’s perspective, unfolds in the same way
as a turn of the standard MHD. But as the top half of the table illustrates, from the
perspective of the game (or the experimenter), the outcome depends on whether the door
initially selected by the player is, in fact, a high-probability or low-probability door.
The breaking of the outcome symmetry among doors in the unequal-probabilities
MHD further results in the availability of the two strategies described in the bottom half
of the table. In these strategies players choose a particular door based on their assessment
of the door probabilities. The data from Experiment 3 indicate that by the end of Phase 1
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and Biased Monty Hall Dilemma of Experiment 3.

Strategies for First and Second Door Choices, with Associated Outcome Probability P(win), for General Unequal Probabilities 3-Door Monty Hall Dilemma

Table 1
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players are able to capitalize on the presence of the high-probability door, which suggests

that players in the unequal-probabilities MHD of Experiment 3 can be usefully
characterized as holders (who will select the high-P door and stick to it) and switchers

(who will select a low-P door and switch away from it) on the first choice of the trial.

This is for two reasons. First, as stated above, although it is possible for players to choose
a door at random, it appears as though they are able to coordinate with the unequal-

Experimentally Induced Bias 56
probabilities structure of the game, and therefore it is unlikely that they are making their
initial choice at random. Second, because their overall strategy is dependent on the initial
selection, so long as the assertion that players know there is a high-probability door
holds, the initial selection is sufficient in the unequal-doors case to characterize a player
as a holder or a switcher.
In the present experiment, the win probability associated with the third strategy
(choose high-probability door and stick) is .8, while the win probability associated with
the fourth strategy (choose low-probability door and switch to high-probability door if it
remains) is .9. It is therefore clear that the fourth strategy remains the optimal one, but the
difference in win percentages is small
In Granberg’s 4-door unequal-probabilities study participants were informed of the
probabilities of finding the prize behind each door. In the present experiment participants
were not informed of the probabilities at any point. The fact that both groups more
frequently selected the highest-probability doors (leftmost for Group L, rightmost for
Group R) is therefore indicative of participants’ ability to coordinate with the structure of
the experimental task, but is not in itself indicative of the strategy a participant may have
adopted.
Only block significantly affected confidence. In this experiment confidence is
measured as distance from the center of the chosen door: The further from the center a
response is made, the less confident the participant was in that response. Therefore the
greater the distance, the lower the confidence. Distance decreased after the first block
before increasing again over the final blocks (Figure 10 left). This indicates that
confidence increased initially before decreasing at the end of the experiment. This can be
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considered an indicator of participants’ level of comfort with the task: After having
initially been exposed to an equal-probabilities MHD in Block 1 (Phase 0), participants
grew more comfortable with the task in Blocks 2 through 5 (Phase 1). However,
confidence decreases at the end of Phase 1 and through Phase 2. Here participants found
themselves confronted with new task constraints, as the unequal-probabilities MHD they
had been solving reverted to the equal-probabilities case and its attendant strategies.
The results of the performance measure (whether the correct door was chosen) show a
similar pattern to the confidence results (Figure 10 right). Initially, there is no difference
in performance between groups. Over the course of Phase 1 (the unequal-probabilities
MHD) performance increases before decreasing again in the final three equalprobabilities blocks (Phase 2). However, the higher proportion of correct responses on 2nd
responses over 1st responses evident in Figure 10 (right) shows that switching remains the
most effective strategy even in the unequal-probabilities case. This fact is also indicated
by the fact that an overall higher proportion of correct responses are seen in 2nd responses
that are switches versus 2nd responses that are holds.
The analysis in terms of hold versus switch trials also makes sense of the overall
higher performance in the unequal-probabilities blocks. The significant Block ×
Response interaction may be attributed to the fact that having a high-probability door
reduces the difference in success between hold and switch trials, leading to an overall
increase in the likelihood of selecting the winning door on a hold trial in Phase 1.
Importantly, confidence does not vary with performance (Figure 10 left). “Holders”
and “Switchers” show almost identical patterns of average confidence, even though
switching is the more effective strategy throughout the experiment, and even though
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participants are aware of their performance (by being told “You win” or “You lose” after
every trial). This finding was further supported by the analysis in terms of switch
quartiles, which showed that how often a participant switched in a given block
significantly affected performance but not confidence. This independence of confidence
and performance lends support to the hypothesis that the aspects of the task about which
a participant might have propositionally-construed beliefs are not necessarily the aspects
that are used to guide behavior (Anderson & Runeson, 2008; Runeson, Juslin, & Olsson,
2000). It is important to note that performance did not significantly differ between the
most and least frequent switchers. As noted above, in this particular version of the MHD
the win percentage of choosing the highest probability door is very close to the win
percentage of adopting the “winningest” strategy. Therefore in this particular instance it
is not altogether surprising that the overall benefit of adopting the “switch” strategy does
not manifest clearly. However it should be emphasized that as a direct consequence of the
unequal probabilities MHD, adopting either strategy, which would lead to a participant
being in the highest switch quartile (switch strategy adopters) or lowest switch quartile
(hold strategy adopters), yields higher performance than adopting neither strategy (as we
may characterize those who fall into the middle quartiles).
The existence of the directional bias over the unequal-probabilities blocks (Blocks 25 composing Phase 1) showed that participants have a general ability to select the highest
probability door. What is most of interest is the persistence of the directional bias in
Block 6, which was the first equal-probabilities block following Phase 1 of the
experiment. This indicates a carryover of strategy from the unequal-probabilities blocks,
until participants once again coordinate with the new task requirements.
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When categorizing the data on the basis of “hold” versus “switch” trials, the success
of the switching strategy is apparent. The other noteworthy finding is that Group L
switched less often than Group R. No explanation consistent with the body of work on
MHD immediately suggests itself, though it may be in keeping with other laterality
effects noted in the present set of experiments. In other words, one hypothesis would be
that participants found it effortful to make successive responses on the left side.
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CHAPTER 7
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 4 was designed with the idea of bringing the current paradigm into closer
contact with the original Asch study. Discussions of Asch (1955) in the years since
publication have focused almost exclusively on the social component of the experiment,
attributing a majority of the explanatory power to the idea of conformity to a group. Asch
noted that his participants’ error rate in line matching (that is, their rate of trials on which
they chose to conform to the group opinion) achieved a maximum when participants were
confronted with between three to seven people who asserted that a non-matching line was
the correct choice. This suggests that it is not just the presence of social pressure but the
degree brought to bear that makes a difference. Even in this case the error rate topped out
at about 1 in 3 trials.
Although Experiments 1 and 2 used a paradigm heavily inspired by Asch, neither
experiment incorporated a social dimension. This was done in Experiment 4. Once again
the manipulation was intended to be as minimal as possible while still being effective. In
the present case, rather than putting people into a “truly” social context (e.g. having
several participants in a room together), a degree of subterfuge was added to the original
paradigm. Score was identified as reflecting the participant’s performance as relative to a
prior participant. The key manipulation of Experiment 4 was a conflict between two
biases, the stimulus bias of Experiments 1-3 and the social bias conveyed by the
aforementioned score manipulation.

Methods
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Participants. Participants were 6 volunteers (ages 25 to 56, 3 males, 3 females)
from the community. Four participants were randomly assigned to the two conditions.
Two left-handed participants (personal report) were assigned to separate conditions.
Design. Participants followed exactly the same procedure as in Experiment 2.
There were only two changes to the design of the previous experiment. First, participants
in were told that the “score” manipulation in Phase I (Blocks 2 through 5) was a measure
of the degree to which their responses correlated with a previous participant in the study.
Crucially, in order to test whether this subterfuge would influence participants’
responses, the direction of bias of “score” was reversed. For below-JND trials in Phase I,
with probability .8, when participants clicked on the side of the screen towards which the
line pairs were biased, their score decremented by 10, and increased by 10 when they
clicked on the opposite side of the screen. The latter was done to put the influence of the
stimulus properties into conflict with the “social” manipulation.
Results
Preliminary examination revealed that the ANOVA method used for Experiments 1-3
was inadequate for the small number of participants. The analysis that follows was
conducted with SPSS. It allows the incorporation of all degrees of freedom in the
experimental design.
A 2 (Group) × 8 (Block) × 3 (JND bin) ANOVA was conducted for the dependent
measures of correct responses, left-click frequency, confidence, and latency.
Correct responses. The only main effect was JND bin, F(2, 3852) = 315.828, p < .001.
Post-hoc tests showed that all bins significantly differed from each other, p < .001. The
smallest-difference bin (Bin 1, comprising line pairs differing by less than half the JND
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of 3.4 pixels) had the lowest proportion of correct responses (M = .56, SD = .5), the
middle-difference bin (Bin 2, comprising line pairs differing by half the JND to 1.5JND)
had more correct responses (M = .65, SD = .476), and the greatest-difference bin (Bin 3,
comprising line pairs differing by greater than 1.5JND) had the most correct responses
(M = .98, SD = .144).
Left-click frequency. Group, Block, and JND bin were significant: Group, F(1, 3852) =
38.114, p < .001, Block, F(7, 3852) = 2.47, p < .05, and JND bin, F(2, 3852) = 12.17, p <
.001. Group 1 clicked on the left less (M = .46, SD = .498) than Group 2 (M = .53, SD =
.499). Post-hoc tests on Block showed that Block 6 differed significantly from Blocks 3
and 4 (p < .05). Post-hoc tests on JND bin showed that Bin 3 differed significantly from
Bin 1 and Bin 2 (p < .001). Group × Block × JND bin was significant, F(14, 3852) =
4.768, p < .001. The effect of Group depended on Block, F(7, 3852) = 7.742, p < .001,
and JND F(2, 3852) = 6.052, p < .01, and the effect of Block depended on JND bin, F(14,
3852) = 2.398.
Confidence. Group, Block, and JND bin were significant: Group, F(1, 3852) =
147.674, p < .001, Block, F(7, 3852) = 6.164, p < .001, and JND bin, F(2, 3852) =
147.336, p < .001. Group 1 was more confident overall (M = 360.42, SD = 201.594) than
Group 2 (M = 326.57, SD = 181.772. Post-hoc tests on JND bin showed that Bin 3
differed from Bin 1 and Bin 2 (p < .001). The Group effect was Block dependent, F(7,
3852) = 147.336, p < .001, and JND dependent, F(2, 3852) = 12.393, p < .001. Block ×
JND bin was also significant, F(14, 3852) = 2.095, p < .05.
Latency. There were significant effects of Block, F(7, 3852) = 6.379, p < .001, and
JND bin, F(2, 3852) = 43.913, p < .001. Post-hoc tests showed that Block 1 differed
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significantly from Blocks 3 (p < .05) and 5 (p < .001). Post-hoc tests on JND bin showed
that the greatest-difference bin (Bin 3) differed significantly from both Bin 1 and Bin 2 (p
< .001). The effect of Group depended on Block, F(7, 3852) = 5.489, p < .001.
Discussion
That the difference between line lengths, coded as JND bin, significantly affected
the number of correct responses made by participants is not surprising. That Block did
not affect the number of correct responses is surprising.
Left-click frequency. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the left-click measure is of
central importance. To reiterate, the proportion of responses made on each side of the
screen is a measure of the extent to which the experimentally-induced biases work. While
both the line-length and score biases in Experiments 1 and 2 were intended to influence
participants’ responses in the same direction, in the present experiment these same biases
were intended to influence participants’ responses in opposite directions. Because of this
conflict, the proportion of responses made on each side of the screen may be taken as
indicative of which bias, stimulus/perceptual or social, comes to dominate in driving
responses to different ends, and not as indicative of the effectiveness of the biases. Leftclick frequencies for Group R and Group L are displayed in Figure 13. As expected,
Group R clicked on the left less frequently overall than Group L. While there was an
overall difference in left-click frequency among several blocks, averaged across groups,
and between the greatest-difference JND bin and the other two bins, these results are not
of immediate interest. The significant Group × Block interaction, however, is of
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Figure 13. Proportion of clicks on the left line as a function of Group and Block in Experiment 4.

immediate interest. Phase 1 (Blocks 2 through 5) is the portion of the experiment in
which the biases are present, with the social bias in conflict with the stimulus/perceptual
bias. As Figure 14 shows, at the beginning of Phase 1 (Blocks 2 and 3), participants
responded primarily on the side of the screen towards which they were being biased
perceptually. Then, in Block 4, both groups responded predominantly on the side of the
screen towards which they were being biased socially. The implication is that participants
were in fact responding on the basis of the social pressure. The pattern of responses
evident in the present experiment was not seen in Experiments 1 and 2. To reiterate,
Experiment 4 differs from them only in the directionality and social character of “score”.
Block 4 is also the locus of the lowest average confidence in both groups, indicating that
although participants had begun to coordinate successfully with the social pressure, as
was the case in Experiments 1-3 their success was not concomitant with confidence in
their performance.
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A final comment on left-click frequency is in respect to Phase 2 (Blocks 6 through 8).
When both types of bias were removed, Group L showed a carryover tendency to respond
on the left. This tendency decayed smoothly throughout Phase 2. Group R, on the other
hand, exhibited a quick rebound to responding almost equally on both sides of the screen,
followed by a slight uptick in left-side responses in Block 8. This asymmetry of
responses in Phase 2 is consistent with the laterality effects observed in Experiments 1
and 2, but there is still no immediately compelling explanation. One candidate
explanation remains the possibility that the bias towards responding on the left, which
requires a crossing of the midline of the body when using the right hand to interface with
the trackpad, constitutes a stronger pressure, which then has a stronger aftereffect.
Confidence. While all the independent variables (Group, Block, and JND bin)
significantly affected confidence, only JND bin affected the number of correct responses,
with larger length differences between lines straightforwardly yielding more correct
responses. This points towards the same dissociation between confidence and correctness
noticed in Experiments 1 and 2.
Further unpacking the results of the ANOVA on confidence requires some stage
setting. In this experiment, as in the three previous experiments, confidence was
measured as number of pixels away from the center of the screen a participant clicked.
The center-line of the screen is treated as the zero point of horizontal distance across the
screen. Responses on the right side of the screen are positive numbers, while responses
on the left side of the screen are negatively valued. Because of this convention, and
because at its most basic confidence is a measure of distance-from-center, we have thus
far found it more useful to conduct analyses on the absolute value of confidence. This is
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so because using the signed confidence measure, which is useful for distinguishing
responses on the left side of the screen from responses on the right side of the screen, will
produce statistically significant differences where, in fact, no difference in confidence
exists. That is, a participant who clicks 100 pixels to the left of center while making a
judgment that the left line is longer is exactly as confident as a participant who clicks 100
pixels to the right of center while making a judgment that the right line is longer — but
analyzing such responses in their signed forms will show that they differ.
The present experiment, however, introduces another lateral symmetry break that
required a different handling of confidence. Whereas in Experiments 1 and 2 the bias
induced by the stimulus properties and the bias induced by score drove participant
responses in the same direction (to either the right or left side of the screen), in
Experiment 4 the two conflicted. The group designated left-biased saw a set of line pairs
containing a left-line-longer bias but, crucially, the “score” bias (which was ostensibly a
measure of coordination with a previous participant, and therefore a “social” bias) would
bias participants to respond on the other side of the screen—in this case, on the right. As
described above, this conflict allowed us to assess the relative strength of the perceptual
bias and the social bias, and constituted the heart of Experiment 4. However, this added
manipulation made it important to be able to distinguish right from left responses on a
block-by-block basis.
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Figure 14. Absolute value of confidence as a function of Group and Block in Experiment 4.

To see why the latter is so, we can compare the graphs of confidence (Figure 14) and
signed confidence (Figure 15). The graph of confidence shows that responses for Group
R (right-biased) increase in value from Block 1 to Block 2, while responses for Group L
(left-biased) decrease in value from Block 1 to Block 2. This could be interpreted as
indicating that Group R on average is more confident in Block 2. However, the graph of
signed confidence indicates that Group L’s absolute confidence decreases in Block 2 in
virtue of becoming more negative—that is, both more confident and more leftward.
Similarly, there is an overlap in confidence for both groups in Block 4, which occurs at a
positive value. In absolute terms it appears as though Group R exhibits a decreasing trend
in confidence from Block 2 through Block 4, while Group L exhibits a sudden increase in
confidence in Block 4 compared to Block 3 and Block 5. The same data represented in
signed terms tells a different story: on average, both Group R and Group L decrease in
confidence in Block 4, with the average confidence for both groups sitting nearly at zero.
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Figure 15. Signed confidence as a function of Group and Block in Experiment 4.

Confidence and signed confidence, therefore, characterize participants’ responses
slightly differently. Once again, because signed confidence conflates magnitude of
confidence with direction of response, until this point the absolute value of confidence
was the more useful measure. With the introduction of the conflicting perceptual and
social biases in Experiment 4 it became desirable to have some way of distinguishing
changes in the magnitude of confidence from changes in the direction of response.
Special contributions of Experiment 4. There were three findings that are important
for the overall picture of the present series of experiments. First, the dissociation between
confidence and task performance, which had been seen in Experiments 1-3, is also seen
in Experiment 4. The presence of this dissociation most clearly supports our central
argument, that belief-as-action and belief-as-assent to a proposition are neither the same
thing nor straightforwardly related. Second, the line-length bias that is perceptual in
nature, and the score bias that in this case takes on the character of a social manipulation,
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were both effective. Third, while the social bias is effective, with sufficient exposure the
perceptual bias comes to dominate.
This last finding is the one that allows us to consider Experiment 4 in the context of
the original Asch studies. As previously discussed, Asch did not find that participants
committed errors wholesale on the basis of social pressure. What is remarkable about his
findings is that participants rendered false judgments at all, because the social bias in
Asch’s studies flew in the face of the perceptual evidence. The distress that participants
evinced, as well as their willingness to offer conforming rather than correct answers, has
been taken on the whole to indicate that participants value social considerations above
considerations of truth. But this is not how we take the results. Asch’s work was not
framed in the terms we find compelling—the distinction between belief-as-action and
belief-as-assent. The present experiments achieve some separation between these notions,
through the introduction of the confidence response as well as the line-length-judgment
response. But in this final experiment, we also created a distinction between the two types
of pressure on participant responses: the perceptual pressure and the social pressure. We
can therefore see how these two types of pressure manifest differently for participants in
Experiment 4. In keeping with Asch’s findings, when participants believe their responses
are being considered against another person’s responses, they exhibit a tendency to
respond in keeping with the social pressure, rather than the perceptual fact of the matter
(or, in the present case, the perceptual bias). But this tendency does not wholly override
participants’ tendency to respond in keeping with perceptual states of affairs. Asch found
that the majority of participant responses were correct on the basis of the perceptual
information—again, what was surprising in his experiment was that participants ever
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responded according to social rather than perceptual factors. We found that participants
begin responding in keeping with perceptual factors, then demonstrate a pattern of
responses consistent with the social pressure. This change coincides with an overall
decrease in confidence. Then, in the final block of Phase 1, participants once again begin
responding consistent with the perceptual bias. Taken as a whole the evidence from
Asch’s study and the present Asch-inspired work suggests that social pressure affects
responses but never completely overrides perceptual factors.
Coda. There are three aspects of this experiment which must be considered distinct:
belief-as-action (the responses a participant makes), belief-as-assent (a participant’s
confidence in their responses), and which type of pressure (social or perceptual)
dominates a participant’s responses at a given point in time. Experiment 4 builds on the
findings of Experiments 1, 2, and 3, which all demonstrate the dissociation of the two
notions of belief. It also distinguishes between the two types of pressure, showing that
social pressure affects responses over and above confidence, but that perceptual pressure
tends to dominate over the course of the experiment. From an ecological perspective this
is perfectly reasonable. The social environment is one to which a social organism must
successfully coordinate, and social information should therefore be expected to drive
behavior. But social information is neither as stable nor, at bottom, as consequential, as
perceptual information, and is unlikely in a setting such as this to ever be the sole driver
of behavior.
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CHAPTER 8
DYNAMICAL ANALYSES
Beliefs are the sorts of things that occur in large numbers, with linkages between
them that may not be directly observable (Quine & Ullian, 1978). How best to understand
the dynamics of belief has been a matter of some debate. One constraint on models of
belief revision is that they must accommodate arbitrarily large numbers of beliefs.
Another constraint arises because when one belief is updated or perturbed it will, in turn,
perturb those beliefs that are somehow connected to it. Some way of assessing these
changes, and the neighborhoods over which they range, is therefore also a needed
component.
So far as we are aware there has been no other attempt to construe the dynamics of
belief using the tools of nonlinear dynamics. We began from the standpoint that the
actions that arise from an underlying belief network might constitute attractors in a
relatively high-dimensional space. We therefore assessed the response measures in the
present experiments as attractors, and the degree to which participants made the
responses as a measure of attractor strength.
We proceeded in keeping with the methods described in Isenhower, Frank, Kay and
Carello (2012). In this method, attractor strength is calculated as the average value of the
transition probabilities towards the response of interest—in this case, left clicks. These
transition probabilities are calculated by treating the data as a Markov process. To
calculate transition probabilities left clicks were represented by ones and right clicks were
represented by zeros. We focused only on below-JND stimuli, and did not incorporate
responses to above-JND stimuli.
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Markov Chain Modeling Experiment 1
A Markov Chain Model in close analogy to that presented by Isenhower, Frank, Kay
and Carello (2012) was developed for the results of Experiment 1 (Chapter 4). As a first
step, a two state model for less-than-JND stimuli was examined. In what follows, the
two-state model for less-than-JND stimuli will be sketched. The two-state model for less
than-JND pairs aims to understand the progression of less-than-JND response trajectories
with the states “left click” and “right click” as shown in Figure 16.

Figure 16. Schematic of transition probabilities calculated for Markov chain estimation of attractor
strength.

The model describes switches from left-click to right-click responses as well as
subsequent responses of the same type. The model has four parameters, only two of
which are independent. The two independent parameters are the transition probability p(L
to R) of switching from a left-click response to a right-click response and the transition
probability p(R to L) of switching from a right-click response to a left-click response.
The transition probabilities were determined for each of Blocks 1-5 (see Chapter 4)
and for each participant using the parameter estimation method discussed in Isenhower et
al. (2012). From the transition probabilities, the attractor strength of the right-click and

Experimentally Induced Bias 73
click states can be estimated. Note that there is only one independent measure for
left-click
attractor strength. We used the strength of the attractor of the left
left-click
click responses.
The primary expectation
ation was a main effect of Group: The left-click
click attractor should
be weaker for Group R (right
(right-biased) than for Group L (left-biased).
biased). That is, p(L to R)
should be higher for Group R than Group L. In contrast, the speculation was that p(R to
L) is lower forr Group R than for Group L. One issue to consider is whether or not the
transition probabilities change across blocks. This would be a hint that the biased-belief
biased
structure that emerges during the experiment affects the response-making
response making dynamics. That
is, if there is a block-group
group interaction then this could support the hypothesis of a circular
causality in opinion-making
making processes as suggested by current models of opinion
opinion-making
(see e.g. Frank, 2008 and references therein).
A

B

C

Figure 17. Individual data and block means of left
left-click frequency for right- and left-biased
biased groups in
Experiment 1.

Results of an analysis of the Markov chain transition probabilities are shown in
Figure 17. Black dots are participant data. Gray dots indicate sam
sample
ple means. The top
panels refer to participants of Group R and the bottom panels refer to participants of
Group L. Across Blocks 1-4,
4, the left
left-click probability for less-than-JND
JND stimuli decays
for Group L and increases for Group R In line with the prediction
prediction made above, the
transition probability p(L
(L to R) was higher for Group R than for Group L, whereas the
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(R to L) was lower for Group R than for Group L. Interestingly,
transition probability p(R
transition probabilities showed a trend across Blocks 11-4. For Group R the transition
probability p(L
(L to R) increased, whereas p(R
(R to L) decreased, which accounts for the
increase of the right-click
click probability (i.e., decrease in left
left-click
click probability) across
Blocks 1-4.
4. The opposite relationship can be observed for Group L. Simulation of the
Markov model yields results consistent with the data. Figure 18 shows simulation results
(crosses) of the model for the right-biased
right biased group using the estimated transition
probabilities as model parameters and starting with an ini
initial left-click
click probability of 0.5.
Experimental data are shown as circles.

Figure 18. Comparison of simulated and experimental data for left
left-click
click probabilities by block in
Experiment 1.

Hypothesis testing was conducted for the transition proba
probabilities p(right
(right to left) for
which a clear pattern is also visible on the basis of the raw data. A two
two-way
way ANOVA for
the effect of block and group on transition probability showed a significant main effect of
group (F(1,17) = 13, p < 0.005), indicating th
that p(right
(right to left) is lower for Group R than
for Group L. There was a significant interaction (F(3, 51) = 3.197, p < 0.05), indicating
that p(right
(right to left) decreased for Group R, whereas it increased for Group L.

Experimentally Induced Bias 75
Markov Chain Modeling Experiment 2
The transition probabilities calculated in the foregoing fashion were used to calculate
attractor strength, γ, for left click for each participant and block. Four participants’ data
were removed; one because the participant responded only on the bias side (in this case,
the right side), which called into question the legitimacy of the responses, and an
additional 3 participants whose data were not analyzable with this method. A repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted on the remaining data. The effect of block was
significant, F(7, 168) = 3.749, p < .01. However, neither group nor the interaction of
group and block was significant. Means for block indicate that γ decreased for both
groups throughout the experiment. As an overall trend γ was lower for Group R than
Group L (see Figure 19, left panel).
Markov Chain Modeling Experiment 3
The same method was again applied to the data from Experiment 3. Our focus in this
experiment was different: in the previous experiments the behavior of interest was
whether participants clicked more often on the right or on the left, and whether the side
they favored was also the side towards which they were being biased. In the Monty Hallstyle experiment, the behavior of interest was what strategies participants adopted under
the different conditions of the experiment. At its most general the MHD turns on whether
players are willing to adopt the switching strategy, and the question we wish to answer
with the current method is under what conditions the likelihood of switching changes. For
Experiment 3, therefore, the Markov model of attractor strength was calculated for hold
and switch rather than for responding on the left- or rightmost door.
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A 2 (group) × 8 (block) repeated measures ANOVA was performed for the attractor
strength γ of switching. There was no significant main effect of either group or block, and
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Figure 19. Gamma as a function of Group and Block for (left) Experiment 2 and (right) Experiment 3.

Discussion of Markov Chain Modeling
The Markov chain models of attractor strength for Experiments 2 and 3 did not yield
the expected results. In Experiment 2 Group — that is, in which direction participants
were being biased — did not have a significant effect. This goes directly against the
hypothesis that the attractor for right-side responses would increase for the right-biased
group and decrease for the left-biased group. It is perhaps less surprising that there was
no significant effect of Group for Experiment 3, since the attractor strength was
calculated for the hold-switch variable rather than for right- or left-side responding. There
is no reason to suspect that the strategy adopted by participants would systematically vary
with Group. However, we expected to see an effect of Block on attractor strength
consistent with participants learning or honing in on the winning MHD strategy. We did
not see this. Reasons why this might be the case are covered more thoroughly in the
general discussion; for the moment, we simply observe that a participant would need to
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appreciate that one strategy was superior to the other as a precursor to consistently
adopting it.
Autoregression Modeling Experiment 2
Each of the present experiments yielded two measures of core interest: judgment and
confidence. Because the judgments in each experiment were binary, the above Markov
method was appropriate for estimating the strength of the attractors of the different
possible judgments. The confidence response, however, was continuously-valued, and
therefore not treatable using this method. A related method was therefore employed. The
time series of confidence responses were analyzed as order 1 autoregressive (AR(1))
processes. Such an analysis allows a time series to be categorized as a stable or an
unstable process and, if stable, whether the process is oscillatory or nonoscillatory – that
is, whether it tends toward a specific value, or not, and if so, whether the process moves
toward its fixed point monotonically. (Chatfield, 1991). The data here were treated only
as a first-order autoregressive process, with a model of the form

X n +1 = a1 ⋅ X n + qn
where X is the value of the process at each time step n, a1 is the first-order
autoregression parameter, and qn is a noise term (Diggle, 1990). It is the value of the
autoregression parameter a1 that describes the stability of the process, with values falling
in the interval (-1, 1) describing stable process, and values outside this interval describing
unstable ones. Negative values falling within the interval describe processes that oscillate
about a fixed point, while positive values within the interval describe processes that
converge monotonically on a fixed point. Using the time series of the unsigned
confidence responses, we calculated a1 and the variance of the noise term qn for each
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participant and block in Experiment 2. That is, in this analysis we considered only the
magnitude of the confidence responses and not their sign (which indicates on what side of
the screen a response was made). Therefore the variable X n in the first-order
autoregression model above reflects deviations from the mean unsigned confidence.
More precisely, for each participant the mean value of the unsigned confidence across all
blocks was calculated. Next the deviations from this time-averaged mean value were
computed. In summary, the variable X n of the model is related to the observed signed
confidence responses Sn in the following fashion:

Sn

U n = Sn

X n = U n − mean (U n )
n

We conducted 2 (group) × 8 (block) repeated-measures ANOVAs on the resulting values
of a1 and Var( qn).
A 2 (group) × 8 (block) repeated-measures ANOVA for a1 showed no significant

ar1 parameter

main effects or interactions. Means are displayed in Figure 20.
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Block
a1 as a function of Group and Block for Experiment 2.

A 2 (group) × 8 (block) repeated-measures ANOVA for the variance in qn was
significant for Block, F(2.376, 61.778) = 12.729, p < .001, η2 = .32, with the

Field Code Changed
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Greenhouse-Geisser correction for a significant Mauchly’s test of sphericity applied.
Neither the main effect of Group nor the Group × Block interaction was significant.
Within-subjects contrasts indicate that the data were consistent with polynomials through
order 4, but visual inspection suggests that the data are probably best fit by a quadratic,

Noise

F(1, 26) = 14.5, p < .01 (see Figure 21).
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Figure 21. Variance in autoregression noise term

qn as a function of Group and Block for Experiment 2.

Autoregression Modeling Experiment 3
The same technique was applied to the confidence data from Experiment 3. Again, 2
(group) × 8 (block) repeated-measures ANOVAs were performed for the values of a1 and

ar1 parameter

the variance of qn calculated for each participant and block.
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A 2 (group) × 8 (block) repeated-measures ANOVA for a1 yielded no significant
main effects or interactions (see Figure 22). A 2 (group) × 8 (block) repeated-measures
ANOVA for the variance of qn was significant for Block, F(3.415, 27.318) = 3.523, p <
.05, η2 = .3, with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for a violation of the sphericity
assumption applied. Within-subjects contrast show that the data are best fit by a quadratic
function, F(1, 8) = 9.109, p < .05. This pattern is visible in Figure 23.
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Figure 23. Variance in autoregression noise term

qn

as a function of Group and Block for Experiment 3.

Discussion of Autoregression Modeling
In both Experiments 2 and 3 the values of a1 calculated per participant and block on
the confidence responses fell into the (-1, 1) interval. This indicates that the confidence
measure represents a stable process; that is, one which approaches a single value. Since
the values are negative, we can conclude that the process represented by the confidence
measure approaches its stable value in an oscillatory fashion: responses will be both
above and below the fixed point as the process approaches it. Values of a1 did not change
significantly in either Experiment 2 or Experiment 3, which is consistent with the claim
that confidence in these experiments tracks a stable aspect of the behavior under
investigation.
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This pattern of results for a1 on the confidence measure is, in our view, consistent
with the findings for confidence from the standard inferential statistics described earlier.
We have already shown that confidence is independent of performance, where
performance can be understood as the measure more closely tied to the facts of the task.
The process that underlies the confidence remains stable throughout the experiment, and
converges on a fixed point, rather than monotonically increasing or decreasing towards
some value. As a first pass at interpreting these results, we argue that this is further
indicative of the extent to which confidence is independent of the task and of
performance on the task. It may be that confidence is somehow endogenous to the
responding system (i.e., the participant), perhaps constituting a relatively more stable or
entrenched type of belief, as opposed to the more easily biased action-based type.
The pattern of results for the strength of the noise term qn for both Experiments 2 and 3 is
straightforward. In each case noise starts at its highest value in Block 1 and decreases
over Phase 1, though rebounding slightly in Phase 2. These results are of a piece with the
earlier-described results for response latency, which together indicate that participants’
comfort and facility with the tasks increase as they encounter more trials. However the
noise measure also shows that the removal of the bias in Phase 2 may affect the
consistency of participants’ responses as they once again adjust to the new task
constraints.
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CHAPTER 9
ANALYSIS IN TERMS OF SIGNAL-DETECTION THEORY
The initial impetus behind the present set of experiments was to subject certain
intuitions about the nature of belief and belief change to empirical methods. To this end
we developed an experimental paradigm inspired by Asch’s work on social conformity in
judgment. This paradigm was employed in Experiment 1, extended in Experiment 2, and
adapted further in Experiment 4. In each case we approached the analysis of participant
data from the perspective that we were assessing whether participants were sensitive to
the presence of the introduced biases—whether they could perceive the stimulus bias, and
whether they were motivated by the score bias. We concentrated on participants’
responses on the side to which they were being biased as indicative of the extent to which
the bias was effective.
The analysis already presented centered on participants’ responses on the below-JND
line pairs. The logic of this concentration is that, for the pairs in which line lengths
clearly differ, participants will likely respond based on which line is longer. But for the
pairs where it’s more difficult to tell, the null hypothesis would be for participants to
respond with equal likelihood on the right or left side. Deviation from a 50/50 split,
towards the bias side, is therefore indicative of the efficacy of the bias, and such evidence
is more common in the pairs that are more difficult to distinguish. Two important
conclusions follow from this logic. First, although erroneous bias-side responses are
expected to be more common in below-JND pairs, the fact that participants sometimes
make them even for above-JND pairs indicates that the introduced biases are stronger
than initially supposed. Second, a bias-side response on a below-JND pair may be the
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result either of the biases or of a guess. This second realization led us to consider another
way of approaching the data.
Instead of considering the data strictly in terms of the presence or absence on a given
trial of the effect of the biases, we instead considered participants’ responses in terms of
their relationship to the stimulus properties – that is, whether participants were
responding accurately given the fact of which line of a pair was longer. To the extent a
participant was consistently able to choose the longer of a pair of lines, any response
might be indicative of their perceptual abilities rather than the effect of a bias. To the
extent that a participant was not able to correctly choose the longer of a pair of lines, any
response might be indicative of guessing, unless such responses were part of a pattern of
consistently responding on the bias-side of the screen. In order to reframe our questions
in appropriate terms, we recoded the data according to the response categories of signal
detection theory. Each participant response therefore became an instance of a hit
(correctly choosing the longer line) or a miss (failing to choose the longer line), and of a
false alarm (responding that a line is longer when the line is shorter) or a correct
rejection (not selecting a line that is, in fact, shorter).
On a forced-choice task such as this, these four response categories are not mutually
exclusive. Given a pair of lines with the right line longer, and a participant response that
the right line is longer, a selection of the right line is both a hit (on the right) and a correct
rejection (on the left). We chose to concentrate on responses falling on the bias side only,
as these were the responses of interest, and categorized them as either hits or false alarms.
To restate our hypothesis in the terms of SDT, we expect that the effect of the bias would
manifest as an increase in bias-side false alarm rates relative to hits.

Experimentally Induced Bias 84
SDT is not limited to just these categories, however. An important component of the
theory is that of responder bias – that a given responder might have a higher or lower
threshold for rendering a judgment that a signal has been detected. In our case the signal
is which line is actually longer; that is, the stimulus properties. Deviation from signal
detection may be attributed to a combination of bias and noise. An individual’s ability to
discriminate signal from noise is captured by d′, which is calculated using our measures
of interest: hit rate and false alarm rate. The equation for d′ is

z ( hit ) − z ( FA) .
Because the blocks in Experiment 2 did not all have equal numbers of bias-side trials, we
calculated d′ on the hit and false alarm rates on bias-side trials per participant and block.
Using a mixed-design ANOVA we compared the values of d′ for both groups across the 8
blocks of Experiment 2. As a final consideration, the calculation of d′ depends on
calculating the z-scores of hit rates and false alarm rates.
A participant’s signal detection profile is also determined by the participant’s bias
towards responding “yes” or “no” to a signal, and by their criterion (the threshold at
which they will make a “yes” response). Bias is measured by both β, a measure of the
likelihood that a signal is present, and also by c, which is the distance between the
criterion value and the point of the signal/noise distribution at which neither response is
favored. These bias measures are of interest insofar as they are indicative of the extent to
which participants make responses based on something other than the signal – in this
instance, the biases introduced by the experimental manipulations. If participants truly
become more attuned (or susceptible) to the experimental biases over the course of the
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experiment, we would expect to see a decrease in average d′ and increases in the bias
measures.
Results
For Experiment 2, d′, β, and c were calculated on bias-side trials per participant, per
block. In all cases the formulas and Excel syntax from Stanislaw and Todorov (1999)
were used.
d′ ANOVA
A 2 (Group, between-subjects) × 8 (Block, within-subjects) mixed-design ANOVA
was conducted for d′. The effect of Block was significant, F(3.987, 107.659) = 98.2, p <
.001, with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for sphericity applied.
Table 2
Significant Mean Differences Between Blocks for Experiment 2 d′ Calculations.
Block
Block

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

0.016

0.045

.121**

.146*

.362**

.368**

.301**

0.029

.105**

.13**

.346**

.353**

.285**

.075*

.1*

.317**

.323**

.255**

0.025

.241**

.248**

.18**

.216**

.223**

.155*

0.006

-.061

2

-0.016

3

-0.045

-0.029

4

-0.121**

-.105**

-.075*

5

-.146*

-.13**

-.1*

-0.025

6

-.362**

-.346**

-.317**

-.241**

-.216**

7

-.368**

-.353**

-.323**

-.248**

-.223*

-.006

8

-.301**

-.285**

-.255**

-.18**

-.155*

0.061

* Difference is significant at p < .01; ** difference is significant at p < .001.

-.068
0.068
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Within-subjects contrasts show that the data are best described by a cubic function,
F(1, 27) = 41.69, p < .001. Significant post-hoc tests are summarized in Table 2.
As Figure 24 shows, d′ values are highest for both groups in Block 1 – that is,
participants’ discrimination between signal and noise is best at the beginning of the
experiment (Group 1: M = .68, SD = .07; Group 2: M =.71, SD = .06). Group 1’s d′
values continued to decrease until Block 7 (M = .3, SD = .08) before rebounding slightly
in Block 8, though the difference between Block 7 and Block 8 was not significant.
Group 2’s d′ values decreased until Block 6 (M = .33, SD = .05) before increasing again
over Blocks 7 and 8 – however, the differences between Blocks 6, 7 and 8 were not
significant.
0.8
0.6

d' 0.4

Group 1

0.2

Group 2

0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Block
Figure 24. Mean differences in d′ as a function of block and group in Experiment 2.

There was no significant main effect of Group, and the Group × Block interaction
was not significant.
β ANOVA
A 2 (Group, between-subjects) × 8 (Block, within-subjects) mixed-design ANOVA
was conducted for β. The effect of Block was significant, F(3.78, 102.06) = 107.69, p <
.001, with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for sphericity applied. Within-subjects
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contrasts show that the data may be described by several polynomial fits, but visual
inspection suggests that they are best described by a cubic function, F(1, 27) = 38.02, p <
.001. Significant post-hoc tests are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3
Significant Mean Differences Between Blocks for Experiment 2 β Calculations.
Block
Block

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

-0.016

-0.004

-0.036

-0.062**

-0.179**

-0.188**

-0.16**

0.013

-0.019

-0.045**

-0.163**

-0.171**

-0.144**

-0.032*

-0058**

-0.175**

-0.184**

-0.156**

-0.026

-0.143**

-0.152**

-0.124**

-0.117**

-0.126**

-0.098**

-0.009

.091

2

0.016

3

.004

-0.013

4

0.036

.019

.032*

5

.062**

.045**

.058**

.026

6

.179**

.163**

.175**

.143**

.117**

7

.188**

.171**

.184**

.152**

.126**

.009

8

.16**

.144**

.156**

.124**

.098**

-0.019

.028
-0.028

*Difference is significant at p < .01; ** difference is significant at p < .001.

As Figure 25 shows, β values were lowest for both groups at the outset (Group 1,
Block 1: M = .71, SD = .04; Group 2, Block 1: M = .73, SD = .03) – that is, participants’
bias was least in the earlier parts of the experiment. For both groups, β steadily increased
until Block 5 (Group 1: M = .77, SD = .05; Group 2: M = .8, SD = .05) before increasing
sharply in Block 6 (Group 1: M = .9, SD = .03; Group 2: M = .9, SD = .03). For both
groups there was no significant difference across the final 3 blocks of the experiment.
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Figure 25. Mean differences in β as a function of block and group in Experiment 2.

There was no significant main effect of Group. With the Greenhouse-Geisser
correction the Group × Block interaction was marginally significant, F(3.78, 102.06) =
2.17, p = .081. This interaction is significant if sphericity is assumed, F(7, 189) = 2.17, p
< .05, but is not significant if the more stringent lower-bound correction is applied (see
Discussion).
c ANOVA
A 2 (Group, between-subjects) × 8 (Block, within-subjects) mixed-design ANOVA
was conducted for c. The effect of Block was significant, F(4.01, 108.32) = 11.49, p <
.001, with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for sphericity applied. Within-subjects
contrasts show that the data may be described by several polynomial fits, but visual
inspection suggests that they are best described by a quadratic function, F(1, 27) = 30.28,
p < .001. Significant post-hoc tests are summarized in Table 4.
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Table 4
Significant Mean Differences Between Blocks for Experiment 2 c Calculations.
Block
Block

1

1

2
-0.022

3

4

5

6

7

8

.065

.064*

.099*

.027

-0.003

-0.007

.087**

.085**

.121**

.048

.019

.015

-0.001

.035

-0.038

-0.067

-0.072

.036

-0.037

-0.066

-0.071

.0.073*

-0.102*

-0.107*

-0.029

-0.034

2

.022

3

-0.065

-0.087**

4

-0.064*

-0.085**

.001

5

-0.099*

-0.121**

-0.035

-0.036

6

-0.027

-0.048

.038

.037

.073*

7

.003

-0.019

.067

.066

.102*

.029

8

.007

-0.015

.072

.071

.107**

.034

-0.005
.005

* Difference is significant at p < .01; ** difference is significant at p < .001.

As Figure 26 shows, c increased for both groups from Block 1(Group 1: M = -.53, SD
= .07; Group 2: M = -.46, SD = .06) to Block 2 (Group 1: M = -.49, SD =.07; Group 2: M
= -.45, SD = .06), although this difference was not significant. For both groups c then
decreased sharply, hitting a minimum in Block 5 (Group 1: M = -.57, SD = .08; Group 2:
M = -.62, SD = .15). This difference is significant, p < .01. For both groups, c then
increased steadily until the end of the experiment in Block 8 (Group 1: M = -.5, SD = .14;
Group 2: M = -.47, SD = .16). The difference between these values and the minimum
values in Block 5 is significant, p < .01.

Mean c values
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Figure 26. Mean differences in c as a function of block and group in Experiment 2.

There was no significant main effect of Group. With the Greenhouse-Geisser
correction the Group × Block interaction was marginally significant, F(4.01, 108.32) =
2.26, p = .067. This interaction is significant if sphericity is assumed, F(7, 189) = 2.26, p
< .05, but is not significant if the more stringent lower-bound correction is applied (see
Discussion).
Discussion
The results of the signal detection measures bear out our original hypotheses. We
found that d′, an indicator of participants’ ability to discriminate between signal and noise
trials (in this case, the presence or absence of a longer line on the bias side) decreases
over the course of the experiment. We argue that this is due to participants’ increased
reliance on (or attunement to) the biasing influences and decreased reliance on stimulus
properties in making their decisions.
The bias measures of β and c also show the expected pattern. Participants’ bias as
measured by β increases throughout the experiment before decreasing slightly (but not
significantly) in the final block. We take this to indicate, as claimed above, that
participants’ responses become more biased (in the sense meant by the vocabulary of
signal detection theory) and less contingent on actual stimulus properties, and that this
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effect persists even when the experimental bias is removed in the final 3 blocks.
Following the recommendation of Stanislaw and Todorov (1999) bias was also calculated
using c. While β and c are both measures of bias, β is a likelihood of responding “yes”
rather than “no”, while c measures the distance between a participant’s criterion for
responding “yes” and the point at which either response is equally likely. Importantly,
negative values of c indicate a tendency to respond “yes”, indicating that the signal – in
this case, a longer line on the bias side – is detected. As can be seen, in this experiment
all values of c for all participants and blocks were negative, and were at their most
negative in the final block of what has been previously characterized as “Phase I” of the
experiment – that is, the phase in which the experimental biases are present.
As expected, no significant main effect of group was observed. That is, although the
groups were biased towards different sides of the screen, their responses were
characterized in terms of being on the bias or non-bias side. We therefore would not
expect to see a difference in the signal detection measures based on group. However, the
calculations for the bias measures showed a marginally significant interaction between
Group and Block. It is possible that this is merely an artifact of the violation of the
assumption of sphericity, as the significant result disappears as more stringent corrections
for this violation are applied. But given the laterality effects observed elsewhere in the
experiment the interaction cannot entirely be dismissed.
In general the attempt to approach the data from Experiment 2 using signal detection
may be considered a success. Both the task and participant responses can be characterized
as the detection of a signal (stimulus properties), which throughout the experiment
becomes more and more subject to participant bias. This likely indicates that the
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experimental bias successfully affects participants’ response bias. However, despite the
utility of such measures, it is not clear that this task is best characterized as the detection
of a signal. Applying the signal/noise dichotomy to such a task creates a distinction
between the “right” properties and the “wrong” properties for the line length judgment
task, which is not the aim of the experiment. Rather, we would like to say that the
experiment provides a task context in which participants’ belief-as-action becomes
divorced from the propositional description of their beliefs about the stimuli themselves.
Reifying a “signal” in the task and using vocabulary that relies on the status of the signal
to describe participant performance implies that e.g. the decrease in d′ is indicative of an
inability to perceptually discriminate between signal and noise rather than a dissociation
between the two notions of belief. The increase in the bias measures somewhat gets at
this dissociation, indicating a shift in participants’ approach to the task, but the
hypothesis of primary interest here is not truly testable within the paradigm of signal
detection theory.
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CHAPTER 10
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The relationships that obtain between action, perception, belief, and the world serve,
via evidence or assumption, as anchoring points for psychological and scientific theories.
A philosophical view of long standing runs like this: perception must be conditioned on
the properties of the world, because if it weren’t, it could not underwrite successful action
(which we clearly engage in), and there would be no reason for consensus about what the
world is like (which to a large extent, there is). But perception cannot be based just on the
properties of the world, because if it were, we would never be mistaken about what we
perceive, which the existence of a myriad of fallacies and illusions suggests we are. So
perception must be the sort of thing that can be in error—and therefore is more like belief
than like knowledge. This is the core of the argument for perception as belief presented
by Armstrong. Although beliefs may be true or not, relatively well grounded or not, and
more or less entrenched, beliefs-as-perceptions are mostly related felicitously to the
world, just as action is mostly successful – if these things were not true, survival would be
unlikely.
One way to approach the problem, then, is to seek the kind of relationships that can
be mostly veridical but occasionally not. The term “supervenience” is one that purports to
satisfy the requirements. Our mental (perceptual, psychological) states supervene on the
physical world, are wholly determined by the nature of and relations in the physical
world, and are isomorphic to but not identical to them. It is this supposed dualism that
creates the breach between the mental and physical that representations are meant to
cross. But they do not, for a laundry list of reasons. The history of thinking on
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representations have made several assertions about their necessary character, however:
one line of thinking1 goes that representations are the things by which we reason, that
they have syntax (and are in other respects language-like), that they do not faithfully
point towards the world, yet that we rely on them just as though they do.
Another historical thread makes very similar arguments for belief: we may draw
conclusions from them, they are things that guide our actions; they have rules by which
they combine, compete, and change; they are not the same as knowledge about the world
(though they are related), yet we are prepared at any time to articulate some subset of our
beliefs and the extent to which we espouse them.
In a sense, then, there is nothing in a propositional account of belief that is not also
shared by representational accounts of mind or perception. They are all part and parcel of
the same set of assumptions about the world and the engagement of agents with it. A
theory of agents that does not take those assumptions on board will therefore find itself in
conflict with the specific treatment of each entity that carries theoretical weight in a
fundamentally dualist explanation. Ecological theory has already extensively critiqued
representational theories of mind from both philosophical and empirical standpoints. As
questions of how agents should and do reason are increasingly considered by those who
take such capacities to be grounded in propositions, it is crucial for ecological theorists to
take on the job of providing explanations not beholden to the dualist way of thinking.
It is for this reason that the present set of experiments was designed—to investigate
belief from an ecological and empirical standpoint. To this end, a distinction was drawn

1

There are views on mind that embrace the existence of mental representations but fail to
endow them with the causal force necessary to guide behavior, and the arguments
presented here are not intended to address these views.
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between two different ways of thinking about belief. First, there is belief in all its
propositional glory, which is perhaps the more well-known way of considering belief.
But then there is belief as a guide to action—to once again borrow the words of Frank
Ramsey, “the map by which we steer”. As he pointed out almost a century ago, there is
something about belief in its role as driving actions that is not compatible with the idea of
beliefs as being propositions about all the myriad features of the world which one might
acquire in the course of interacting with the world. Showing that one possesses both
species of belief but that they are not equivalent, then, takes a step toward an
understanding of belief that is not beholden to its propositional character.
There were already indications that these two species of belief are not equivalent. The
famous Asch experiment (Asch, 1955) showed the extent to which people may be
induced to act not in keeping with beliefs they seem to hold. Participants in his study
acted in accordance with majority opinion in cases where the majority opinion flew in the
face of perceptual evidence, and in some cases showed obvious distress and confusion at
doing so. That is, the propositional beliefs they held (“This line is longest”) served only
as a partial guide to their actions.
One may argue in response to this that it isn’t the case that the Asch subjects failed to
act in accordance with their propositional beliefs, only that they considered other, also
propositional beliefs, more valuable, perhaps beliefs like “I believe that sometimes I’m
wrong, and I believe that everyone else seems to know what they’re doing,” in which
case they may be led to the conclusion “I believe that others may be right and I may be
mistaken”. At this point we assert a different, ecologically-informed reading: that these
sorts of propositional beliefs are descriptions of the agent’s overall state, but not the
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content of it. So if we are attempting to build on the Asch paradigm and construct further
empirical methods for investigating the relationship between perceptions and beliefs we
will want to structure them in such a way that allows us to delve into the content – the
underlying nature of the perceiving-acting system.
Fortunately, such methods exist. Particularly, the sciences of complexity and selforganizing systems provide a suite of methodological and analytical tools for addressing
questions about systems that are high dimensional at a component level but lowdimensional at a behavioral level. One thing all accounts of belief have in common is that
whatever beliefs are, agents have very many of them, and they are interconnected. This
has led to accounts either treating impoverished sets of beliefs, or being mathematically
intractable. Treating behavior as a self-organizing system that arises in part from beliefs,
however, may offer a different sort of solution.
The foregoing experiments constituted an attempt to do just that. One cannot
experimentally assess all of an agent’s beliefs, but restricting an empirical investigation
to just one or just a few propositional beliefs provides a severely restricted view of the
nature and dynamics of an agent’s belief set. Behavior can be experimentally assessed but
a measure is needed that ties behavior to belief. A paradigm was therefore constructed
that attempts to fulfill both these goals. In the present experiments, participants provide
an overt measure of behavior (correct responses, bias-side responses) as well as a more
covert measure of their own state (confidence). They are placed into experimental
contexts that provide lower-order regularities (distribution of line lengths or winning
doors) and higher-order ones (the dynamically generated score of Experiments 1, 2 and 4,
and the winning strategy of the Monty Hall Dilemma in Experiment 3) and their
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responses indicate the extent to which those regularities are reflected in their behavior.
Finally, they are placed into these contexts for long enough, and asked to make responses
often enough, that the data generated by these experiments are sufficient for the analytical
tools developed to deal with self-organizing systems to be brought to bear.
The paradigm is new, and needs refinement, but at a first pass it works. Biases are
successfully introduced and in some fashion persist. Actions are undertaken not wholly in
keeping with degree of assent to the correctness of the action. Frank (2008) had already
examined the Asch data and showed that behavior remains low dimensional (only two
outcomes) even when the dynamics underlying it are more finely-grained. A similar
finding is hinted at in the results of the current studies: there is a great deal of variability
between trials and between participants, but the larger-scale dynamics show patterns of
consistency.
The methodological approach we adopted for these experiments has made clearer
several issues concerning the multiple scales and dynamics of belief, perception and
action. One question is at how many scales do such phenomena manifest themselves? As
we have seen in our treatment of the main hypothesis – the separability of the two notions
of belief – as well as in Frank’s (2008) analysis of the original Asch data, there are lowdimensional and high-dimensional components of the system that as a whole produces
some judgment or action with respect to a task like the ones presented here. We have
treated these low- and high-dimensional processes analytically through the use of
traditional inferential statistics, which look at aggregate behavior over a large number of
trials and a longer time scale, and through the use of dynamical analyses, which look at
trial-by-trial behavior and a concomitantly shorter time scale.
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Putting these analytical tools in a theoretical context allows us to say more on the
issue of the scale of the processes in question. This is best illustrated by returning to the
results from Experiments 3 and 4. As we saw in the discussion of the dynamical analyses,
for both groups the attractor for switching was strongest in Block 2, grew steadily weaker
throughout Phase 1, and then recovered in strength throughout Phase 2, before again
achieving a local peak in Block 8. We interpret this pattern in terms of the possible
strategies participants could adopt: By Block 2, participants have played 100 trials of the
standard MHD. We take high strength of the switching attractor in Block 2 to indicate
that participants have to some extent been able to tune into the fact that switching is the
more successful strategy. Herbranson and Schroder (2010) had found that pigeons are
able to capitalize on the success of the switching strategy given sufficient time to learn
(or be trained on) the strategy. We believe something similar is at work here: on a single
trial, or even on a handful of trials, the winning MHD strategy is not obvious. Over many
trials, with outcome feedback provided, the structure of the strategy may begin to reveal
itself. On this reading it would make perfect sense for the switching attractor to be at its
strongest after a participant has already experienced a series of trials.
However, the switching attractor then gets progressively weaker over the course of
Phase 1, wherein the unequal-doors case is introduced. This result can be framed as a
perturbation or destabilization of the task landscape that participants navigated in Phase
0. The task environment changes, which may in and of itself serve to weaken the
attractor. The way in which the environment changes — the doors are no longer equally
likely to conceal the prize — in turn changes the win probabilities of employing the
various strategies. In this case, the difference in win probability between the easy-to-
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discover ‘hold’ strategy and the hard-to-discover ‘stick’ strategy (.8 versus .9) may not be
sufficient to drive participants into a ‘switch’ attractor, even though switching remains
the better strategy. These considerations highlight both the weakness and the promise of
the experimental methods developed here. As they stand, the present experiments serve
only as preliminary steps towards truly exploring the dynamics of belief as they relate to
the behavior of sophisticated perception-action-cognition systems. They constitute a
technique for acquiring and analyzing behavioral data pertaining to the set of questions
already in play about the structure and nature of beliefs. But few conclusions can as yet
be drawn. Most encouragingly, a distinction was successfully demonstrated between the
two notions of belief — as action-oriented or propositionally-construed — which lends
credence to the account here advanced of how belief might be brought into line with a
larger body of psychological theory. But a fully-fledged account of the dynamics of belief
is lacking. The data presented here were not sufficient to completely situate these
experiments on belief within dynamical systems theory. Perhaps the most glaring absence
is that of an identifiable control parameter, manipulation of which might in turn cast more
light on the extent to which the behaviors of interest in these experiments — line length
judgments or MHD strategies — constitute attractors in some appropriately delineated
space. Attempting to isolate such parameters is the obvious next step. For the MHD in
particular, one candidate is the extent to which one strategy is clearly better than another,
e.g. by how much more a player can increase their chances of winning an unequalprobabilities MHD using a ‘switch’ rather than ‘hold’ strategy.
These results motivate further consideration on larger questions of dynamics and
scale. Ecological theory emphasizes that perception and action both take place on a
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macro scale appropriate to the size of the perceiving-acting, organism-environment
system. But each such system has smaller-scale or componential dynamics, such as those
obtaining at the level of muscles or neurons. These components are not only typically
smaller than the higher-level phenomena to which they are related, but are many more in
number than the macro phenomena. Here sit the well-known issues of the relationships
between levels of a phenomenon, of causal determination and of the appropriate scale of
explanation. Similarly, the products of cognition, such as behaviors and judgments, must
be scaled to the world in which those products are deployed. But they rest on a collection
of entities that operate on a different scale. We may call some of these entities beliefs. As
has been shown in the literature on epistemology, a formal account of belief update must
respect the (very large) number of beliefs each agent possesses, the way in which those
beliefs are updated in the face of evidence and the results produced by those updates. In a
real agent this is exactly the issue of how cognition, perception, and action are related.
But while there are intuitive ways to divide the three according to function or to scale,
ecological theory and dynamical systems theory hold that the divisions are pragmatic at
best and confusingly ad hoc at worst. Understanding belief requires respecting the
complexity of the issue without yoking the idea of belief to their propositional and
language-like character to the detriment of belief’s role in perception-action-cognition
systems as meaningful wholes.
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